Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan

Summary

After more than three years of war, the conflict in Sudan is becoming more complex and difficult to resolve. By mid-2026, regional involvement in the war had deepened significantly while the longstanding risk of conflict spillover into the territories of countries neighbouring Darfur had become a reality.

Instability along border areas between Libya, South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and Darfur was particularly pronounced. In Chad, the war significantly fuelled cross-border tensions and insecurity, while also exacerbating tensions related to Zaghawa dynamics and RSF activities. Along the Libya–Sudan border, armed groups and RSF logistical networks moved personnel and *materiel*. In CAR, the conflict contributed to localized violence, illicit cross-border activities, and continued recruitment by the RSF. In South Sudan, recruitment of fighters continued and securing oil supplies were a priority for both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

The support and involvement of regional actors became increasingly overt and intense, further internationalizing the conflict and complicating efforts for containment. Despite multiple peace initiatives, the entrenched positions of the warring parties and competing regional interests continued to impede meaningful progress. As a result, diplomatic efforts failed to halt the fighting, secure a political settlement, or adequately address the worsening humanitarian crisis.

This heightened interference and unyielding stance of the warring parties has contributed to a more complex and fragmented conflict environment. Armed groups splintered into rival factions while gravitating toward either side of the conflict, numerically strengthening but politically undermining the SAF and RSF leaderships. Consequently, principal belligerents have encountered difficulties in maintaining discipline and unity among their forces and allies.

Meanwhile, the Panel established that both SAF and RSF used three types of drones in Darfur: strategic drones, one-way attack drones and multirotor drones. In addition, the RSF utilized the N'Djamena–Nyala air corridor to transport fighters, foreign mercenaries, and military equipment, including drones and weapons, into Darfur. The increasing reliance on drones to project military power and the sustained influx of arms into Darfur not only violated the Security Council imposed arms embargo but also intensified the suffering of civilians.

The Sudanese people have borne the brunt of the conflict in Darfur, facing escalating, widespread and targeted violence, displacement, abductions, arbitrary detentions, sexual violence, and one of the world's most severe humanitarian crises. The RSF used rape and other forms of sexual violence as a tactic of war; the RSF killed at least 6,000 people in its three-day offensive on El Fasher in late October 2025 where acts of violence constituted war crimes, many amounting to crimes against humanity.

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I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 4 of resolution 2791 (2025), the Security Council requested the Panel of Experts on the Sudan to submit a final report by 13 July 2026. Due to the late appointment of the arms expert the Panel requested a one-month extension of the deadline. On 13 May 2026, the one-month extension of the deadline to submit the Panel's final report was approved by the Committee. Consequently, the final report was to be submitted to the Committee on 13 July 2026 and to the Security Council on 12 August 20263.

2. The Panel notes that the composition of the Panel was completed at a late stage of the mandate. While three experts were appointed on 2 October 2025 (S/2025/616), two additional experts remained to be appointed. The armed groups expert was appointed on 11 February 2026 (S/2026/74), the finance expert on 24 February 2026 (S/2026/92), following the inability of the previously appointed finance expert to assume his duties. The arms expert was appointed on 6 May 2026 (S/2026/388). The Panel drafted its final report from 29 June to 4 July 2026; the advance copy of the report was transmitted to the Committee on 13 July 2026. Accordingly, the newly appointed experts had, in practice, only until late June 2026 to conduct investigations, travel, engage with sources, assess and corroborate information, conduct follow-up inquiries and contribute substantively to the report.

3. Given the budgetary constraints, the Panel had to cut the report to 16,200 words. Consequently, important content had to be moved to the annexes to ensure that the report remained within the newly prescribed word limit.

4. The Panel visited Port Sudan in February 2026. It held meetings with the National Coordination Committee and members of the Military Intelligence Service, the General Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Finance, the Humanitarian Aid Commission, the Unit to Combat Violence Against Children and Women, and UN agencies. The Panel wishes to express its appreciation to the Government of the Sudan for the support it received during its visit to Port Sudan.

5. During its mandate, the Panel conducted multiple official missions to Egypt, Kenya and Uganda. The Panel was unable to undertake additional travel due to visa constraints. See Annex 1 for Cooperation and Non-Cooperation with the Panel.

6. The Panel worked in full conformity with the best practices and methods recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997). See Annex 2 on the Panel's working methodology.

7. During the reporting period, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan listed a total of eight individuals.[1]

8. The Panel monitored the implementation by Member States of the asset freeze and travel ban measures in accordance with paragraph 3(d) and paragraph 3(e) of resolution 1591 (2005). The Panel received credible information that Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo (SDi.008) and Al-Goney Hamdan Dagalo (SDi011) visited Kenya between 24 February and

[1] See 1591 Sanctions List and related Narrative Summaries https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1591/materials.

30 May 2026.[2] Information was received that the listed individuals are linked to a number of assets in Kenya.[3] The Panel has since written to the Republic of Kenya to confirm this information.[4] At the time of writing the report, no response was received.

II. Armed Groups

9. After more than three years of war in Sudan, it has become even more intractable during the current reporting period. Armed groups have undergone interrelated processes of fragmentation into competing factions and formal alignment with either the RSF or SAF,[5] while the RSF and SAF have also faced their own challenges maintaining cohesion. Meanwhile, conflict dynamics have the following patterns: further territorial consolidation by the RSF and SAF; a relative shift away from Darfur toward a principal front line in North Kordofan and South Kordofan and a secondary front line in Blue Nile; heavy reliance by the RSF and SAF on remote warfare through drones;[6] and the ongoing paramount importance of cross-border supply routes, rear bases, and external support. Cumulatively, external support for armed groups has amplified the risk of the war in Sudan either becoming a catalyst for the onset of armed conflict between adjacent states or escalating into an interstate conflict involving multiple state militaries. Lastly, mercenaries recruited from Colombia and hired by a private military company based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been instrumental for the RSF's military operations, further underscoring the adverse international dimensions of the war.[7]

A. Armed Group Developments

10. The war in Sudan involves numerous armed groups, most of which had formed during previous armed conflicts, and many of which have since fragmented due to differences regarding alignment within the current conflict. (See Annexes 4 and 5)

11. During the current reporting period, the most significant development concerns Revolutionary Awakening Council (RAC), which announced cooperation with the Joint Forces in September 2025 and then formally integrated with SAF in March 2026.[8] RAC's shift stemmed from events concerning UN-sanctioned Musa Hilal (SDi.002), who had founded the armed group in January 2014.[9] Hilal, a long-time rival of Hemedti and the hereditary ruler of the Mahameed clan of the Rizeigat community, survived an RSF drone

[2] The two individuals were listed on 24 February 2026 and 28 April 2026 respectively, see https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/un-sc-consolidated-list#individuals.
[3] Interviews with three independent sources based in Nairobi, May 2026.
[4] Letter from the Panel to the Republic of Kenya dated 15 June 2026 with reference S/AC.47/2026/PE/OC.21.
[5] See also S/2025/239, paragraphs 5-8; and S/2024/65, paragraphs 7-12.
[6] For consistency and readability, the term drones will be used throughout the report. This term refers to unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), which is the formal technical designation. See also S/2025/239, paragraph 43.
[7] See also S/2025/239, paragraph 15 and Annex 5.
[8] *Sudan Tribune*, "Musa Hilal's council and joint force to form new military unit", 21 September 2025, see https://sudantribune.com/article/305278; and *Sudan Tribune*, "Army chief Burhan, Musa Hilal vow to fight until RSF defeated", 9 March 2026, see https://sudantribune.com/article/311514.
[9] United Nations, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing", see https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1591/materials/summaries.

assassination attempt and RSF ground offensive on his North Darfur stronghold of Misteriha in February 2026, prompting formal alignment with SAF.[10]

12. These recent developments regarding Hilal and RAC are interrelated with the subsequent defection of two senior RSF commanders, Maj. Gen. Al-Nour Ahmed Adam "Al-Qubba" and Brig. Gen. Ali Rizeigallah "Al-Savana", in April 2026 and May 2026. Al-Qubba and Al-Savana have longstanding ties with Hilal, both from the Mahameed clan in North Darfur which Hilal leads, while Al-Savana was also arrested and faced a military trial with Hilal in November 2017. To a certain extent, the defections of Al-Qubba and Al-Savana are indicative of increasing tensions within the RSF between the Mahameed clan and the Mahariya clan, to which Hemedti and his brothers belong, of the Rizeigat community. There seems to be an element of opportunism in each defection, which may be a response to the Dagalo control of the RSF, increased infighting within the RSF, and decreasing rent seeking opportunities for the extraction of resources from civilian populations.[11] Al-Qubba defected in part due to an ongoing disagreement with RSF leadership regarding not being appointed RSF commander for North Darfur after the fall of El Fasher in October 2025; while Al-Savana defected after relations had deteriorated with the RSF second-in-command, Abdulrahim Hamdan Dagalo, and he had been put under RSF surveillance.[12] Whatever their underlying motives, the defections of Al-Qubba and Al-Savana represent a loss of experienced battlefield commanders for the RSF and a gain of intelligence sources for SAF.

13. While SAF is an institutionalized military force, it has faced challenges maintaining its broad military coalition – which includes armed groups as disparate as the Darfur-based Joint Forces and the Al Bara Ibn Malik Brigade. For example, the fall of El Fasher to the RSF in October 2025, where SAF retreated from its 6th Infantry Division headquarters but much of the Joint Forces remained to defend the city, raises questions regarding relations between SAF and the Joint Forces, and or at the very least their coordination of military operations. Likewise, SAF's integration of former RSF senior commanders, Al-Qubba and Al-Savana, understandably may not be received well by certain Joint Forces leaders, particularly as they were involved in the warfare and takeover of El Fasher.[13] Meanwhile, developments regarding the Al Bara Ibn Malik Brigade, a force estimated at 20,000 and associated with the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, pose another challenge for SAF. The US sanctioned Al Bara Ibn Malik Brigade in September 2025, and then also sanctioned the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood in March 2026.[14] Within the context of the US-Israel war with Iran, SAF has needed to balance difficult trade-offs involving the Islamist faction of its

[10] *Sudan Tribune*, "Army chief Burhan, Musa Hilal vow to fight until RSF defeated", 9 March 2026, see https://sudantribune.com/article/311514.

[11] Interviews with civil society, April-June 2026. See also: Ali Mahmoud Ali and Nohad Eltayeb, "How is RSF infighting reshaping the war in Sudan?", ACLED, 18 May 2026, see https://acleddata.com/report/how-rsf-infighting-reshaping-war-sudan.

[12] Interviews with civil society, April-June 2026. See also: Africa Intelligence, "Burhan undermines the RSF from within", 24 April 2026, see https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2026/04/24/burhan-undermines-the-rsf-from-within,110711227-art.

[13] Interviews with local and international sources, November 2025-June 2026. See also: Africa Intelligence, "Burhan undermines the RSF from within", 24 April 2026, see https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2026/04/24/burhan-undermines-the-rsf-from-within,110711227-art.

[14] US Department of Treasury, "Treasury Sanctions Sudanese Islamist Actors to Counter Regional Instability and Support for Iran", 12 September 2025, see https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0246; and US Department of State, "Terrorist Designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood", 9 March 2026, see https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/03/terrorist-designation-of-the-sudanese-muslim-brotherhood.

coalition. Ultimately, SAF remains dependent upon the Joint Forces and the Al Bara Ibn Malik Brigade to do much of the fighting against the RSF, but there remains a risk that their interests and allegiances may diverge.[15]

B. Conflict Dynamics

14. The geography of territorial control has become increasingly consolidated into two blocks, with the RSF controlling most of the west and SAF controlling most of the east of the country.[16] The two most critical events for this process of territorial consolidation have been SAF's retaking of the capital Khartoum in March 2025 and the RSF's capture of El Fasher in October 2025 (See Chapter III analysis and Annex 6 for more detail). After 18-months of urban warfare over the last city in Darfur under the control of SAF and its allies, the RSF captured El Fasher, North Darfur, in October 2025.

15. The focus of recent armed conflict has shifted away from Darfur and toward North Kordofan and South Kordofan states, with another front in Blue Nile state. Control over North and South Kordofan is seen by the RSF and SAF as critical. For the RSF, control over Kordofan could open up a path toward recapturing Khartoum and the central region of Sudan; while for SAF, control over Kordofan could enable an offensive pushing into RSF-held Darfur. Most of the fighting has centred around three cities and their transit corridors: El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state; Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan state; and Dilling, the second largest city in South Kordofan. At the time of writing, all three cities were held by SAF, but were under threat by RSF and allied forces, particularly El Obeid.[17] The RSF-aligned al-Hilu faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N/al-Hilu) has been active in both South Kordofan and Blue Nile, where another front has developed. Joint offensives in Blue Nile by the SPLM-N/al-Hilu and RSF may function to divert SAF resources away from Kordofan, but with sufficient territorial gains they could also potentially open a route into SAF-held central Sudan. Much of the recent fighting in Blue Nile – including SAF drone strikes and artillery shelling – has been at Kurmuk near the border with Ethiopia, which has been held by the RSF and SPLM-N/al-Hilu since March 2026.

16. Relative to the outset of the conflict in April 2023, drones are now more widely held by the RSF and SAF, fundamentally altering certain aspects of combat in Sudan and Darfur. The RSF and SAF possess an increasingly wide array of drones. The Panel was able to verify three types of drones used in Sudan, including Darfur. Panel monitoring of drone strikes in Darfur suggests a significant increase in strikes and civilian casualties in 2025, with a further escalation in the first quarter of 2026. (See section IV)

17. Cross-border supply routes, rear bases, and external support have fundamentally impacted conflict dynamics in Sudan. Each of the seven countries bordering Sudan has been linked to the conflict: Egypt and Eritrea maintain positions broadly aligned with SAF; Ethiopian territory has been utilized by the RSF; while the territories of the Central African

[15] The Sudan Shield Forces formed by military intelligence in late 2022, aligned with SAF at the start of conflict, switched to the RSF in August 2023, and then realigned with SAF in October 2024.

[16] There are a few exceptions, the Jebel Marra region of Darfur, under the control of the non-aligned Sudan Liberation Army – Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW); parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, under the control of the RSF-aligned Sudan People's Liberation Movement North (SPLM-N)/al-Hilu; and geographically isolated outposts such as Tina, Kornoi, and Umm Baru, North Darfur, under the control of the SAF-aligned Joint Forces.

[17] United Nations, "Security Council Press Statement on Sudan", SC/16392, 20 June 2026, see https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16392.doc.htm.

Republic (CAR), Chad, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAFF)-controlled eastern Libya, and South Sudan have been utilized by the RSF for supply routes (see Chapter V including map and confidential annex). Beyond adjacent states: Kenya has openly engaged politically with the RSF[18], and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) supported the RSF by providing mercenaries; while Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye have maintained relations with SAF.[19] Thus far, the regional and international dimensions outlined above appear to have had the following cumulative effects on armed groups and conflict dynamics: increased resiliency of armed groups as they can rely on external support to maintain viability; resistance to third party mediation and a determination to pursue a military solution (i.e. while the RSF and SAF may not perceive imminent victory they are convinced that they can avoid defeat); and increased conflict intensity and duration, both of which come at an increasingly high cost to civilian populations. (See sections III and IV).

C. UAE Support to RSF

18. Since August 2024, Colombian mercenaries have been recruited, hired, trained, and deployed into Sudan and Darfur to fight on behalf of the RSF. The mercenaries were recruited by a Colombia-based firm, International Services Agency (A4SI), operated by Alvaro Andres Quijano Becerra (SDi.012) and owned by his wife Claudia Vivian Oliveros Forero (SDi.013), both of whom – along with a business associate Mateo Andres Duque Botero (SDi.014) – were sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council's 1591 Committee in April 2026.[20] The mercenaries were hired by a UAE-based firm, Global Security Services Group (GSSG).[21] GSSG was founded in 2016 by Ahmed Mohammed Al-Humairi, Secretary-General of the Presidential Court of the UAE, who transferred his shares in July 2017 to his longtime business associate Mohamed Hamdan al-Zaabi. Despite al-Humairi's divestment from GSSG, he remained business partners with al-Zaabi in three security companies and the two men also previously owned shares of three other security companies together.[22] GSSG also continued to be closely tied to the Government: its website states that it was a preferred security provider for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Presidential Affairs.[23] Furthermore, under UAE law private security companies

[18] According to the US Office of Foreign Assets Control, Al-Goney Hamdan Dagalo has a Kenyan passport, (see "Notice of OFAC Sanctions Actions", 27 February 2026, https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-03966.pdf?1772113516); TASIS (See Annex 9) launched in February 2025 with an office in Nairobi; interviews with regional analysts in April 2026, indicated Kenya uses state resources to provide security for RSF commanders when they visit Nairobi.

[19] Interviews with regional analysts, April-May 2026. See also: International Crisis Group, "Divided Sudan, Elusive Peace", 13 April 2026, see https://www.crisisgroup.org/brf/africa/sudan-egypt-saudi-arabia-united-arab-emirates-united-states/b211-divided-sudan-elusive-peace.

[20] United Nations, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing", see https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1591/materials/summaries.

[21] Panel review of primary documentation, July 2026.

[22] Panel analysis and review of third-party corporate records, July 2026. See also: The Sentry, "Sudan Mercenaries Linked to Business Partner of Top UAE Bureaucrat", November 2025, see https://thesentry.org/reports/sudan-mercenaries-rsf-uae-bureaucrat/.

[23] Global Security Services Group "Diplomatic Security Services", see https://gss-group.net/.

are required to fully coordinate with the Ministry of Interior to ensure that their activities are not in conflict with established security measures.[24]

19. The Panel reviewed evidence indicating that the mercenaries have been transported from Colombia and deployed into Darfur using a mix of commercial flights, chartered flights, and overland transport involving different combinations of intermediate locations functioning as training facilities, logistics hubs, or transit points: Abu Dhabi, UAE; Bossaso, Puntland, Somalia; Benghazi and Al-Kufrah in Haftar-controlled eastern Libya; and N'Djamena, Chad.[25] Evidence indicated that two military bases in Abu Dhabi, Ghayathi and Al Wathba, were used as training facilities for the mercenaries. Another important training facility has been located at the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) base in Bossaso, Puntland (a region of Somalia), where the UAE military finances, trains, and supervises the PMPF. Mercenaries typically arrived at Abu Dhabi or Bossaso on commercial flights and then departed on chartered flights, often to Benghazi or Al-Kufrah, where they would prepare for overland transport into Darfur.[26] An incident in November 2024, when the Joint Forces ambushed a convoy of Colombian mercenaries crossing from Libya into Sudan, provided confirmation of their deployment and the Libya transit route.[27] Panel analysis of flight data showing a surge of Ilyushin Il-76 cargo flights into Al-Kufrah from April to December 2025 has further corroborated its function as a RSF logistics hub.[28] The Panel reviewed evidence indicating that N'Djamena has served as a transit point, where the pattern has been mercenaries arriving at night, briefly remaining at the military wing of the airport, and then taking a flight to Nyala, South Darfur.[29]

20. Colombian mercenaries, informally known as "Desert Wolves", assumed a range of roles for the RSF, while operating near Nyala and at El Fasher among other locations. The mercenaries have been involved in operating drones as well as ground combat, such as supporting infantry units, driving armoured personnel carriers, and operating artillery. The Panel reviewed evidence, including satellite imagery, geo-located video, tracked mobile

[24] UAE Legislation, *Federal Law No. (37) of 2006 Concerning Private Security Companies, Article 13*, see https://uaelegislation.gov.ae/en/legislations/1985.

[25] Panel interviews with conflict monitors and review of evidence including flight manifests and mobile phone tracking data, July 2026. See also: Human Rights Watch, "From Bogotá to El Fasher the UAE's Role in the Deployment of Colombian Fighters and Other Backing to the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan", May 2026, see https://www.hrw.org/report/2026/05/25/from-bogota-to-el-fasher/the-uaes-role-in-the-deployment-of-colombian-fighters; and Conflict Insights Group, "Blood Money: How UAE Support and Foreign Mercenaries Enabled the Fall of El Fasher", April 2026, see https://www.conflictinsights.org/s/BloodMoneyCIG.pdf

[26] Ibid.

[27] See also: Carlos Gonzalez, "Colombian Mercenaries in Transit to Sudan via Libya - What do we Know?", Bellingcat, 13 December 2024, see https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2024/12/13/colombian-mercenaries-in-transit-to-sudan-via-libya-what-do-we-know/; Santiago Rodríguez Álvarez, "I want to go back: There are more than 300 Colombian ex-military personnel in the war in Sudan", *La Silla Vacía*, 26 November 2024, see https://www.lasillavacia.com/silla-nacional/me-quiero-devolver-hay-mas-de-300-exmilitares-colombianos-en-la-guerra-de-sudan/; and S/2025/239, paragraph 15.

[28] Panel analysis and review of flight tracking data, July 2026. See also: Conflict Insights Group, "Blood Money: How UAE Support and Foreign Mercenaries Enabled the Fall of El Fasher", April 2026, see https://www.conflictinsights.org/s/BloodMoneyCIG.pdf.

[29] Panel interviews with conflict monitors and review of evidence including mobile phone tracking data, July 2026. See also: Human Rights Watch, "From Bogotá to El Fasher The UAE's Role in the Deployment of Colombian Fighters and Other Backing to the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan", May 2026, see https://www.hrw.org/report/2026/05/25/from-bogota-to-el-fasher/the-uaes-role-in-the-deployment-of-colombian-fighters; and Conflict Insights Group, "Blood Money: How UAE Support and Foreign Mercenaries Enabled the Fall of El Fasher", April 2026, see https://www.conflictinsights.org/s/BloodMoneyCIG.pdf.

devices, and first-hand accounts that indicated the mercenaries established a camp at Nyala airport as of March 2025, where they were most likely responsible for operating RSF drones.[30] Military planning is likely to have been another important role for the mercenaries, as a twenty-two page document shared by the Government of Sudan appears to outline an operational plan for the siege and capture of El Fasher.[31] Substantial evidence indicates the presence of Colombian mercenaries during the siege and capture of El Fasher: witness accounts; geolocated videos showing Spanish-speaking contractors fighting alongside the RSF; and two incidents in December 2024 and July 2025, where Colombians were captured by the Joint Forces.[32]

21. The scale of the Colombian mercenary deployment remains uncertain and subject to change. In a September 2025 letter to the Security Council, the Government of Sudan estimated the number of Colombian mercenaries at "between 350 and 380", which was then also stated as "between 350 and 380" in the narrative summary of listings for Quijano and Oliveros in April 2026.[33] However, higher estimates between 1,500 and 2,000 based on former mercenary statements, are credible.[34]

22. In response to the Panel's letter (S/AC.47/2026/PE/OC.23 from 18 June 2026), UAE denied providing military support to any warring party in Sudan since the outbreak of the conflict, denied that GSSG has been involved in any mercenary activity in Sudan, and stated that GSSG did not have any links to individuals reported to be mercenaries in Sudan.

III. International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights

A. Three years of war in Darfur

23. After three years of war, the current population of Darfur was unknown but estimated at being at least 11 million people.[35] There were approximately 9 million internally displaced

[30] Panel interviews and review of evidence, July 2026.

[31] *S/2025/555, Letter dated 5 September 2025 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council*, Annex XI, 5 September 2025, see https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4091008?v=pdf.

[32] Panel interviews and review of evidence, July 2026. See also: Human Rights Watch, "From Bogotá to El Fasher The UAE's Role in the Deployment of Colombian Fighters and Other Backing to the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan", May 2026, see https://www.hrw.org/report/2026/05/25/from-bogota-to-el-fasher/the-uaes-role-in-the-deployment-of-colombian-fighters.

[33] *S/2025/555, Letter dated 5 September 2025 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council*, Annex XI, 5 September 2025, see https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4091008?v=pdf; and United Nations, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing", Permanent reference numbers SDi.012 and SDi.013, see https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1591/materials/summaries.

[34] Santiago Rodríguez Álvarez, "Despite sanctions, mercenary operations expand in Sudan*", La Silla Vacía*, 9 December 2025, see https://www.lasillavacia.com/en-vivo/pese-a-sanciones-operacion-de-mercenarios-se-expande-en-sudan/.

[35] UN humanitarian planning population OCHA 2025 https://data.humdata.org/dataset/cod-ps-sdn.

persons (IDPs) in Sudan, the majority having been displaced by the current war. Out of these, an estimated 64% (5,8 million) were spread across the five states of Darfur.[36]

24. During the reporting period, within this context, food insecurity remained a significant challenge, with risks of famine increasing across Darfur.[37] Access to food was severely constrained and dependent on displacement, market availability, food prices and household income. Women and girls were disproportionately affected, and female-headed households were more likely to experience food insecurity exposing them to higher risks of various forms of exploitation, including labour and sexual exploitation (see Chapter III E).[38] An estimated 5 million children in Darfur faced extreme deprivation,[39] many having experienced violence, displacement, poverty and food insecurity. Over 3,3 million school aged children could not attend school, exposing them to protection risks, including exploitation and the recruitment into armed groups.

25. Despite the fact that humanitarian needs remained most acute in Darfur, sustained humanitarian access and presence remained a significant challenge due to administrative impediments, limited humanitarian entry points, active fighting and insecurity, including drone attacks (see Chapter IV).[40]

B. International Humanitarian Law violations in the takeover of El Fasher[41]

26. During the RSF takeover of the El Fasher, widespread and serious violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law took place. These included indiscriminate attacks with heavy artillery and drones on civilian areas and civilian objects, forced mass displacement, acts of extreme violence without distinguishing between civilians and combatants, targeted attacks against civilians and persons *hors de combat*, mass killings, summary executions, abductions for ransom, mass detentions, torture and ill-treatment of detainees, and the widespread rape of women and girls.[42] Many of these acts constituted war crimes, and those committed as part of widespread or systematic attacks against civilians, amounted to crimes against humanity.[43]

[36] IOM DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot, May 2026 see: https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudan-displacement-and-return-snapshot-5.

[37] Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) 2026 see: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1163315/?iso3=SDN.

[38] Interviews with local monitors, March-June 2026. Sudan: Women, Food Insecurity, and Famine Risk in Sudan, Gender Snapshot (21 July 2025) see: https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-women-food-insecurity-and-famine-risk-sudan-gender-snapshot-21-july-2025.

[39] UNICEF Child Alert. Darfur 20 years on, children under threat April 2026, see https://www.unicef.org/media/180271/file/FINAL_2026_Child%20Alert_Darfur.pdf.pdf.

[40] Interviews with humanitarian interlocutors, March-June 2026.

[41] The international humanitarian law analysis in this chapter was corroborated through multiple Panel interviews with 66 interlocutors, including remote online video interviews with 28 firsthand eyewitnesses and residents of El Fasher who fled the violence and were displaced within Darfur, remote and in person interviews with Darfur IDPs, refugees, local monitors, and humanitarian workers, November 2025-June 2026. In addition to this, the Panel reviewed, geolocated and verified footage of the violence shared on social media, X and Telegram.

[42] Violations of Geneva Conventions Art. 3 and Customary International Humanitarian Law Rules 1, 11, 14–15, 47, 87, 89–90, 93, 97, 118, 129. Civilians and persons *hors de combat*, including those detained or who have surrendered, are protected against attack.

[43] Many of the acts documented are prohibited under the Geneva Conventions and constituted serious violations of Customary International Humanitarian Law Rule 156. If committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian population, the acts may amount to a crime against humanity.

27. The widespread violence resulted in the forced mass displacement of an estimated half of the remaining civilians in El Fasher. Prior to 26 October 2025, approximately 260,000 civilians lived in the city. During the RSF takeover, up until 1 March 2026, an estimated 138,000 people were forcefully displaced and fled to Tawila and surrounding rural villages west and north of the city.[44] Thousands of people remained missing. The total number of killings that took place during the takeover of the city from 25 to 27 October 2025 was difficult to verify. The estimate from Panel interviews with firsthand eyewitnesses was broadly consistent with the OHCHR findings of over 6,000 deaths.[45]

28. RSF combatants used the derogatory term *falangayat* continuously and throughout their attacks on non-Arab civilians suspected to be SAF and Joint Force fighters.[46] Eyewitnesses confirmed that if RSF was aware of individuals' Zaghawa identity, those would be treated worse than individuals from other communities.[47] The SAF-aligned Joint Force fighting against RSF comprised largely of Zaghawa fighters (see Panel's final report S/2025/239 paras. 10 and 20).

29. The Panel established that RSF used rape as a tactic of war during military operations. Furthermore, rape remained a significant occurrence in RSF controlled territories (see Annex 7 for investigation).

30. At the time of writing, arbitrary detentions of civilians continued across Darfur, including women and children.

C. The fall of El Fasher and the war on civilians

1. El Fasher – 18 months of urban warfare[48]

31. El Fasher was the epicentre of the conflict between RSF and SAF and the aligned Joint Force in Darfur from early 2024 until the RSF takeover of the city on 26 October 2025. Before the fall, El Fasher was the administrative capital of North Darfur and remained the

[44] Following the RSF takeover of El Fasher, Tawila hosted approximately 652,000 IDPs, an estimated 40% of all IDPs in North Darfur see: IOM DTM Focused Flash Alert: Al Fasher, North Darfur (Update 14), April 2026, see https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-focused-flash-alert-al-fasher-north-darfur-update-14 and UN Women, Gender Dimensions of Food Insecurity in Sudan, November 2025 https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2025-11/gender-alert-last-and-least-gender-dimensions-of-food-insecurity-in-sudan-en.pdf.

[45] The Panel interviewed 28 firsthand eyewitnesses and civilian residents of El Fasher who fled the violence and were currently displaced within Darfur who all confirmed seeing various dead bodies in the city, when fleeing the city and on route to find safety. See also OHCHR report para 15 "They were shooting us like animals": the RSF final offensive and capture of besieged El Fasher (24-30 October). https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/sudan/2026-02-13-rsf-offensive-fasher-capture-1-en.pdf.

[46] *Falangayat* is a derogatory term meaning subservient traitor.

[47] The Panel interviewed firsthand eyewitnesses and local monitors concerning the ethnic dynamics of the violence. Over 10 testimonies from men who fled from El Fasher during the RSF takeover stated that the violence was more severe towards non-Arabs, particularly from the Zaghawa community.

[48] The international humanitarian law analysis was corroborated through multiple Panel interviews with 66 interlocutors, including remote online video interviews with 28 firsthand eyewitnesses and residents of El Fasher who fled the violence and were displaced within Darfur, remote and in person interviews with Darfur IDPs, refugees, local monitors, and humanitarian workers, November 2025-June 2026.

only location in Darfur with a SAF presence, thus resulting in a key battleground for territorial control (see Panel's final report S/2025/239).

32. For 18 months, civilians endured intense urban warfare characterized by heavy artillery bombardments, ground confrontations between the SAF-aligned Joint Force[49] and RSF, and SAF airstrikes. Continuous indiscriminate heavy artillery shelling hit civilian neighbourhoods (see paras 19, 22-24 and section B of Panel's final report S/2025/239). Civilians were forcefully displaced multiple times throughout the city. To keep safe from the attacks people hid in homes and in underground makeshift bunkers. Trade, food and essential supplies were blocked. Access to food, water and medical services were severely limited. All these intensified from August to October 2025, particularly the RSF use of drones and heavy artillery. (See Annex 6).

2. No distinction between civilians and combatants

(a) Forced mass displacement & no safe passage for civilians[50]

33. In the days preceding the takeover of the El Fasher, 24-25 October 2025, RSF further intensified heavy artillery shelling and drone attacks, in Daraja Oula and Abu Shouk neighbourhoods. Civilian homes were hit. During these dates, an eyewitness sheltering in Daraja Oula saw over 70 dead bodies accumulating in the streets. The heavy attacks led to thousands of civilians deciding to flee the city.

34. In the early morning on 26 October 2025, thousands of civilians and former combatants in Daraja Oula and Abu Shouk neighbourhood gathered in the streets to flee the city. The shelling and drone attacks restarted and continued from 6 am to 6 pm. Civilians described a chaotic flight as they tried to escape, moving in large groups amongst thousands of people, including men, youth, women, children, and former combatants, running in various directions. Many headed towards the University area of the city, and subsequently to the west exit towards the small village Garni (see map below).[51] Groups of people attempting to flee the city were chased, indiscriminately attacked and some killed in the street.

35. Eyewitnesses testified to many dead bodies accumulating in the streets inside the city, including those of women and children, most having been indiscriminately killed in the shelling and drone attacks. All firsthand eyewitnesses confirmed that the road between Daraja Oula and the University area was littered with a large number of dead bodies.[52] Furthermore, dead bodies were seen on the road when exiting the city through the west, including those of women and children. Although the total death estimate was difficult to verify, the Panel analysis was consistent with the OHCHR estimates of at least 4,400 people killed within the city and 1,600 people killed when trying to flee.[53]

[49] See para 6 of the Panel's final report (S/2025/239). The SAF-aligned Joint Force comprises members of a number of signatory groups to the Juba Peace Agreement.

[50] The Panel conducted remote online video interviews with 28 firsthand eyewitnesses and residents of Daraja Oula and Abu Shouk neighbourhoods who were in the city during this time.

[51] Garni is a small community northwest of El Fasher on the road to Kutum. Garni is located approximately 11 km from the RSF built sand wall surrounding El Fasher and is 15 km northwest from Abu Shouk IDP camp.

[52] The Panel conducted remote online video interviews 28 firsthand eyewitnesses who fled the city during the RSF takeover.

[53] See footnote 14.

(b) Door to door raids in Daraja Oula – summary executions and detentions

36. In October 2025, RSF combatants entered Daraja Oula and conducted house to house raids executing those men and youth known to be SAF and Joint Force members, arresting suspected fighters and supporters, looting valuables and vehicles. RSF combatants executed those who resisted. Firsthand accounts confirmed the executions; one eyewitness' brother was shot in front of her. Civilians who remained in the neighbourhood, including women, were detained.

(c) Arriving at the sand wall – Garni gate mass detention and executions


37. On 26 October 2025, in the early morning and throughout the day, hundreds of people fleeing the city arrived at the Garni exit at the sand wall and trench that surrounded El Fasher. It took people several hours to leave the city. On the road civilians were attacked, looted of their belongings and men as well as youth were killed. Women and girls were raped (see analysis below). Firsthand accounts confirmed seeing hundreds of dead bodies when leaving the city before reaching the sand wall.

38. At the sand wall, an RSF checkpoint blocked the exit and the road towards Garni village (see map below). RSF combatants separated all men and youth from large groups of unarmed people. Most women, children and older people were allowed to pass the checkpoint. Nevertheless, those who attempted to resist the RSF combatants separating and removing people were executed, including women. One female eyewitness confirmed seeing eight people in her group being executed at the checkpoint. Another female eyewitness saw her mother being executed when resisting RSF combatants from taking her daughters.

39. Men and youth, including some women, were detained *en masse* and held sitting in the sun, enduring insults, threats and beatings. By mid-day, there were approximately 2,000 detainees, by late afternoon the number had accumulated to more than 4,000 detainees. Those suspected of being Joint Force commanders were interrogated and subjected to torture, and some were executed.[54]

40. Those civilians who weren't detained and could continue to Garni confirmed seeing hundreds of dead bodies with bullet wounds, mostly of men and youth, before the sand wall, at the sand wall and on the road when heading towards Garni.

[54] The Panel interviewed firsthand eyewitnesses who were subjected to ill treatment at the sand wall. Civilians and persons *hors de combat* are protected against attack and must be treated humanely. Killings and executions without due process, torture, and cruel or inhuman treatment constitute violations of the Geneva Conventions Art. 3, and Customary International Humanitarian Law Rules 89, 90.



Sources: Esri, TomTom, Garmin, FAO, NOAA, USGS, © OpenStreetMap contributors, and the GIS User Community.

3. Widespread detentions, including of women and children[55]

41. IHL requires humane treatment and adequate conditions of detention for persons deprived of their liberty, including access to sufficient food, water, sanitation and medical care. The detention of men, women and children where ill-treatment, including rape, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment was inflicted upon detainees, as well as the deprivation of adequate food, water and medical care, constituted violations of IHL.[56]

42. During the RSF takeover of El Fasher, the detention of civilians and persons *hors de combat* was widespread. Thousands of people were detained in multiple detention facilities across the city. Detainees included women and children. RSF combatants arbitrarily detained and arrested women and girls if suspected to support SAF or the Joint Force. Following the takeover, all civilians were presumed to have supported the Joint Force. The Panel confirmed that women and children were detained in informal detention centres, including the

[55] This section was based on interviews with eyewitnesses, survivors, local monitors, May-June 2026.

[56] Violations of the Geneva Conventions Art. 3 and Customary International Humanitarian Law Rules 87, 89, 90, 93, 118.

Children's Hospital and Al Mena Al Bary (see Annex 8) where they were subjected to sexual violence.

43. The Panel was able to verify the existence six detention locations; the Children's Hospital and Al Mena Al Bary detention centre in the east of El Fasher, Shala prison southwest of the city, Al Manhal detention centre in the city centre, and Zamzam IDP camp southwest of the city. In addition, RSF combatants used abandoned homes and buildings as informal detention facilities across El Fasher, the location depending on the RSF command of the area. People were also detained in nearby villages, including in Shagra, Korma and Um Jalbakh. Furthermore, at least 6,000 prisoners were taken to Tagris prison in Nyala, South Darfur.[57] Hundreds of deaths, including executions, occurred in these detention locations due to ill treatment and torture. (See Annex 6 and 8).

4. Executions, systematic and widespread abduction for ransom of civilians and persons *hors de combat* by RSF and allied militias[58]

44. When trying to flee the city and reach safety, male youth, men, women and children were abducted for ransom. Those detained were provided with access to contact families who were pressured to pay sums ranging from approximately 1 million to 30 million Sudanese pounds (USD 300-10,000), depending on the hostage profile and the wealth of the family, in exchange for safe release of their family member.[59] Many were detained in inhuman conditions and showed signs of ill treatment. Men and youth who were unable to pay were insulted (*falangayat*), beaten and at times executed. Women who were abducted and held captive were raped multiple times (see para. 49). The pattern of abduction for ransom was widespread, systematic and well organized between RSF and allied militias. All those interviewed by the Panel had at some point been forced to pay for their release from detention or paid for transport in RSF controlled vehicles to ensure their safety when heading towards Tawila and elsewhere.

45. Those who managed to flee El Fasher were arbitrarily detained in Shagra, Korma and Um Jalbakh villages in makeshift detention sites and extorted for their safe release. For example, at the RSF checkpoint in Shagra, eyewitnesses confirm that those men and youth suspected of being SAF, a Joint Force member or trying to escape were executed, others were detained.[60] Many dead bodies were seen on the road, mostly of men and youth. One eyewitness confirmed seeing at least 30 dead male bodies.

46. The Panel verified ransom payments were made into six accounts, ranging between Sudanese Pounds (SDG) 5,000 to 3,000,000 (USD eight to 5,000) amounting to a total of USD 88,000. Financing of the RSF through ransom has likely become systemic.[61] The Panel continues to investigate the RSF networks involved in these abductions, the flow of ransom payments, and the extent to which such funds are used to finance RSF operations.

[57] OHCHR Sudan, Report on the RSF final offensive and capture of besieged El Fasher 14-30 October 2025, 13 February 2026, see https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ohchr-report-rsf-final-offensive-and-capture-besieged-el-fasher-24-30.

[58] All those interviewed by the Panel confirmed this pattern. The Panel interviewed 66 interlocutors, including 28 firsthand eyewitnesses and residents of El Fasher who fled the violence and were displaced within Darfur, remote and in person interviews with Darfur IDPs, refugees, local monitors, and humanitarian workers, November 2025-June 2026.

[59] Estimates were based on Panel interviews with 40 firsthand eyewitnesses and local monitors.

[60] Shagra is approximately 25 km from Tawila.

[61] Interviews with eight independent sources in Kampala, Uganda 7-8 April 2026.

5. RSF indiscriminate attacks resulting in mass killings and summary executions[62]

47. On 27 October 2025, clashes between RSF combatants and a convoy with various vehicles and a large group of people, including civilians, armed SAF and Joint Force fighters, erupted near the sand wall and trench east from Garni gate towards Wana mountain (see map above). RSF combatants carried out indiscriminate attacks resulting in the mass killings of hundreds of civilians, including women who had been attempting to flee with the group.[63] Verified footage further confirmed RSF combatants walking along the sand wall among various dead bodies in civilian clothing scattered in the trench, near the wall where the clashes took place. RSF combatants were heard shouting the derogatory term *falangay* and celebrating the number of people they had killed.

48. The RSF Commander Al-Fateh Abdullah Idris Adam "Abu Lulu" (SDi.009) personally summarily executed 14 captured unarmed men in civilian clothing. (See Annex 6 for Panel verification).

6. Conflict-related sexual violence against women and girls[64]

49. During the takeover of El Fasher, the use of rape against women and girls was widespread. RSF combatants in uniform raped women, young girls and children when attempting to flee the city and on the route to reach safety in Tawila. Young women and girls between 15-25 years were particularly targeted. The Panel received information of cases of children under 5 years old being raped. In some cases, women and girls were raped in front of family members. Multiple testimonies from survivors confirm that RSF abducted women and girls, some held for up on 31 days, during which they were raped several times by multiple RSF combatants. (See Annex 6 for case examples).

[62] Footage received from various trusted sources, originally posted on social media including telegram, X accounts. All footage was time-corroborated and geolocated through cross-referencing and analysis of satellite imagery, provenance assessment, and visible and audible indicators within the footage. Events were corroborated through a combination of independent sources, including on the ground interlocutors, eyewitness accounts, and open-source reporting. Commander identities were established through a multi-factor assessment, including analysis of uniforms and insignia, visible physical and identifying features, verbal references within footage, and corroboration across multiple independent sources. See also Annex 2 for methodology.

[63] Customary International Humanitarian Law Rules 1, 11, 14-15 prohibit indiscriminate attacks and requires the parties to the conflict at all times to distinguish between civilian and combatants. Civilians who do not take a direct part in hostilities may not be attacked. In addition, such killings constitute a violation of the Geneva Conventions Art.3.

[64] This section is based on over 30 testimonies, including remote online video interviews with survivors of sexual violence having fled El Fasher during the RSF takeover, and multiple interviews with reliable sexual and gender-based violence monitors and local monitors. The Panel used the terminology CRSV as sexual violence formed part of a wider pattern of violence and was occurring within a context of impunity in Darfur directly linked to the conflict.

D. RSF commanders and control structure in the takeover of El Fasher[65]

50. On 26 October 2025, RSF seized control of the Sudanese Armed Forces 6th Infantry Division headquarters, the main SAF and Joint Force army base, and their last stronghold in Darfur (see map above).

51. On 27 October 2025, the Sudanese Armed Forces General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan released a statement saying that the approval of withdrawal of troops was to spare civilians and the city from further destruction in response to the "systematic destruction and killing of civilians".[66]

52. RSF commanders responsible for the attack, siege, and fall of El Fasher enumerated in descending order of military rank included:

(a) Deputy Commander in Chief Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo (SDi.008)

i. The Panel verified his presence during the take-over of the 6th Division HQ and as the most senior in command during the takeover of El Fasher.[67]

ii. The Security Council 1591 Sanctions Committee designated him for the following acts: engaging in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Darfur, including acts of violence and human rights abuses, particularly in El Fasher.[68]

(b) Major General Al-Nour Ahmed Adam "Al-Qubba"[69]

i. Formed part of the senior leadership in RSF with direct contact with Abdul Rahim Hamdam Dagalo. Al-Qubba was present in a commanding role issuing direct orders during the urban warfare and the RSF takeover of El Fasher.

ii. In April 2026, Al-Qubba announced his defection from the RSF and joined SAF.

(c) RSF Sector Commander for El Fasher Gedo Hamdan Ahmed "Abu Shok/Abu Nashuk" (SDi.007)

i. The Panel verified his presence during the takeover of the 6th Division. Commander Abu Shok managed operations in El Fasher since 14 June 2023 (See Panel report S/2025/239, paragraph 40).

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[65] This section is based on multiple interviews with 30 interlocutors, including armed group members, independent local and international experts and analysts, eyewitnesses and survivors of the violence, IDPs and refugees. Panel used photographic evidence and footage received from various trusted sources, originally posted on social media including telegram, X accounts. All footage was time-corroborated and geolocated through cross-referencing and analysis of satellite imagery, provenance assessment, and visible and audible indicators within the footage. Events were corroborated through a combination of independent sources, including on the ground interlocutors, eyewitness accounts, and open-source reporting. Commander identities were established through a multi-factor assessment, including analysis of uniforms and insignia, visible physical and identifying features, verbal references within footage, and corroboration across multiple independent sources.

[66] Sudan Tribune 27 October, see https://sudantribune.com/article/306470.

[67] See footnote 65.

[68] See https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/abdul-rahim-hamdan-dagalo.

[69] See footnote 65.

ii. The Security Council 1591 Sanctions Committee designated him for the following acts: engaging in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Darfur, including acts of violence and human rights abuses, particularly in El Fasher.[70]

(d) Brigadier General Ali Rizeigallah "Al-Savana"[71]

i. The Panel verified his role as a prominent senior RSF commander present and giving orders in El Fasher, taking part in the urban warfare and the takeover of the city.

ii. Responsible for the recruitment of local Darfuri and foreign fighters.

iii. In May 2026, Al-Savana announced his defection from the RSF and he later joined SAF.

(e) RSF Field Commander Tijani Ibrahim Moussa Mohamed "Al Zeir Salem" (SDi.010)

i. The Panel verified his presence during the takeover of El Fasher in the role as a prominent commander giving orders and taking part in hostilities.

ii. The Security Council 1591 Sanctions Committee designated him for the following acts: engaging in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Darfur, including acts of violence and human rights abuses, particularly in El Fasher.[72]

(f) RSF Commander Al -Fateh Abdullah Idris Adam "Abu Lulu" (SDi.009)

i. The Panel verified his acts of committing summary executions of unarmed men who attempted to flee the city during the RSF takeover. See analysis above.

ii. The Security Council 1591 Sanctions Committee designated him for the following acts: engaging in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Darfur, including acts of violence and human rights abuses, particularly in El Fasher.[73]

E. Sexual violence used as a tactic of war under RSF command and control

53. Since the outset of the conflict, the Panel documented the widespread use of rape and other forms of conflict-related sexual violence by RSF during conflict hostilities. The RSF use of rape during military operations to capture cities was verified in El Geneina, West Darfur and Nyala, South Darfur (see Panel report S/2024/65). In addition, the widespread use of rape was verified during the urban warfare in El Fasher as part of operational strategies to displace civilians, occupy homes, loot property and take control over neighbourhoods (see Panel report S/2025/239). Similarly, the Panel verified RSF's widespread used use of rape

[70] See https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/gedo-hamdan-ahmed.
[71] See footnote 65.
[72] See https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/tijani-ibrahim-moussa-mohamed.
[73] See https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/al-fateh-abdullah-idris.

of women and girls fleeing during the takeover of El Fasher (see analysis above). Rape was also used against women and girls when in detention (see Annex 6 and 8).

54. The RSF widespread use of rape over the course the three-year conflict across multiple locations in Darfur confirms that the acts were neither random nor isolated, but a repeated pattern and consistent modus operandi. This is indicative of an organizational policy in which the RSF used rape and other forms of sexual violence as a tactic of war.[74] Consistent with this finding, the Panel received information from an RSF commander confirming that during the urban warfare in El Fasher and the final takeover of the city, senior RSF commanders issued direct orders to commit rape against civilian women and girls of specific non-Arab communities.

55. Within RSF ranks, senior commanders encouraged the use of rape and other forms of sexual violence, issuing orders "kill the *falangayat* and rape their women". Such orders explicitly encouraging rape were seen to boost morale and formed part of the rewards to combatants. Although some senior commanders instructed their forces not to commit sexual violence, the prevailing policy was that it was an acceptable and encouraged war tactic which was not prohibited. Throughout the conflict, commanders and combatants acted with complete impunity and with the knowledge of senior RSF command, further confirming the Panel's assessment of an organisational policy and tactic of war.

56. The RSF used rape as a tactic of war to humiliate, intimidate, instil fear and forcefully displace non-Arab women and girls. This tactic significantly contributed to the RSF's military advance and consolidation of territorial control forcing communities to flee and threatening peace and security in Darfur.

57. Furthermore, widespread conflict-related sexual violence persisted in RSF controlled areas. See Annex 7 for in-depth investigation.

58. Customary international humanitarian law prohibits rape and other forms of sexual violence, which may constitute war crimes and, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians, crimes against humanity.[75] Security Council resolution 1820 (2008) further recognizes that rape can be used as a tactic of war.

F. Arbitrary detentions and abductions for ransom continued across Darfur

59. RSF arbitrary arrests and detentions were ongoing, widespread and included detention in overcrowded severely inadequate facilities with limited access to food, water, sanitation, and medical care. Detainees were subjected to ill-treatment, torture, sexual violence and died in custody. Women and children were among those detained. (See Annex 8 for case studies on current detentions in El Fasher and in Nyala).

[74] In the third year of reporting on patterns, based on over 200 interviews with survivors, eyewitnesses, civilians, IDPs, refugees, local monitors, international organizations, national organizations and members of armed groups. The Panel analysed the use of rape as a tactic of war based on the pattern, scale, and purpose of the acts, consistent with Security Council resolution 1820 (2008).

[75] Customary International Humanitarian Law prohibits the use of rape and other forms of sexual violence in armed conflict. CIHL Rule 93. Under international criminal law rape and other forms of sexual violence constitute war crimes. Where committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians, such acts may also amount to crimes against humanity. ICC Rome Statute Articles 7,8.

60. RSF continued systematically abducting for ransom and arbitrarily detaining civilians with extortion practices, including of women. For example, in Saraf Umrah in North Darfur civilians were detained, including at least three doctors, and were released in exchange for extortion payments.[76]

61. The arbitrary detention of civilians, ill-treatment and torture, cruel treatment and the denial of adequate food, water, and medical care resulting in deaths, constituted serious violations of IHL.[77]

IV. Armed drones in Darfur and civilian impact[78]

A. Weapon use

62. The Panel observed that SAF and RSF used three types of uncrewed combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) in Sudan[79], including in Darfur;

(a) Strategic UCAVs;

(b) One-way attack drones (OWA), also called loitering munitions (LM) or kamikaze drones; and

(c) Multirotor uncrewed aerial vehicles (MUAVs).

63. During the reporting period, the Panel observed a widespread adoption of armed drones by belligerent parties. At the outset of the conflict, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) were the only party operating air assets. SAF sustained substantial losses to their crewed aviation fleet[80] while nonetheless temporarily maintaining air superiority over RSF. The exponential increase in the use of drones by SAF and RSF has since levelled the playing field. SAF and RSF have progressively integrated armed drones into their operations, primarily strategic UCAVs and one-way attack (OWA) systems.

1. RSF - Strategic UCAV CASC CH-95

64. The Panel identified a strategic UCAV used by RSF as the CASC Rainbow CH-95 (also named Cǎi Hóng CH-95).[81] The Panel verified the presence of a damaged CH-95 standing at the threshold of the runway 22 of Nyala airport on 31 May 2025.[82] Although the

[76] Interviews with local human rights monitors, civil society interlocutors May 2026.
[77] Geneva Conventions Art. 3 and Customary International Humanitarian Law Rules 87, 89, 90, 118
[78] For consistency and readability, the term armed drones will be used throughout this section. This term refers to unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), which is the formal technical designation.
[79] Annex 10 provides the characteristics and distinctions of the three types of drones.
[80] See websites that compile information on aircraft that have suffered damage: https://aviation-safety.net/database/countries/ST and https://www.baaa-acro.com under 'Sudan', corroborated by Airbus satellite imagery of Khartoum International Airport on 15 April 2023, 30 November 2024, 16 February 2025; Wadi Sayyidna on 5 February 2024, 26 December 2024, 16 February 2025 and 8 March 2026, Jebel Aulia heliport on 20 April 2023, 5 February 2025 and 26 May 2025.
[81] Annex 11 outlines 16 key identification characteristics of a CH-95 drone.
[82] The Panel reviewed, analysed, and geolocated video footage of the drone at Nyala airport, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BH-HrXxnThI&t=4s uploaded on 3 August 2025, recorded on 31 May 2025.

Panel was unable to detect the external markings, serial number or part numbers, it can confirm that the drone was armed with GB-25A guided bomb. The Panel continues to investigate the chain of custody of the drone and the missile.

65. The Panel verified the presence of additional strategic drones, highly likely of the CH-95 type at Nyala airport from May to end of June 2025 (see Annex 13).[83] The Panel concluded with certainty that the RSF possessed and operated the CH-95 drones.[84]

2. Strategic UCAV Baykar Bayraktar Akıncı[85]

66. The Panel reviewed publicly available information regarding the presence and deployment of Baykar Bayraktar Akıncı ("Akıncı") strategic drones.[86] In addition, credible reports indicate that both SAF and RSF were deploying this type of drone in Sudan.[87]

67. RSF claimed to have downed various Akıncı drones in Darfur. On 10 July 2025, a social media report purported that RSF downed an Akıncı drone near El-Fasher, North Darfur, followed by a news report on the crash.[88] On 4 September 2025, a second Akıncı drone was reportedly shot down, this time near Nyala, South Darfur.[89] On 8 January 2026, the RSF claimed that it downed an Akıncı drone in Nyala.[90]

The Panel verified satellite imagery of the location taken on 31 May 2025 the analysis of which confirms the presence of the drone. Annex 12 provides images of the drone.

[83] An analysed and annotated satellite image acquired from Airbus in June 2026 and captured on 9 May 2025 as Annex 13. Four additional satellite images, captured between 7 and 29 June 2025, were reviewed as corroborating material.

[84] In July 2026, confidential Member State sources indicated to the Panel that RSF is almost certainly the only party operating the CH-95 drones, including from Nyala airport. It is likely that the drones are operated by foreign actors.

[85] Annex 14 outlines identification characteristics of the Akıncı drone.

[86] This consisted of social media posts, news reports, and external analyses. For example; "RSF claim 'Baykar Bayraktar Akıncı drone downed over South Darfur capital'", Radio Dabanga, 26 August 2025, see https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/rsf-claim-baykar-bayraktar-akinci-drone-downed-over-south-darfur-capital; "Sudan drone warfare kills thousands as both sides secure advanced technology", Sudan Tribune, 17 February 2026, see https://sudantribune.com/article/310795; A manufacturer-issued webpage detailed information on the Bayraktar AKINCI is available at: https://baykartech.com/en/uav/bayraktar-akinci/ .

[87] Confidential sources and see: Nohad Eltayeb and Ali Mahmoud Ali "How has Sudan's drone war adapted to shifting supply lines? ", ACLED, 4 June 2026, see https://acleddata.com/report/how-has-sudans-drone-war-adapted-shifting-supply-lines "Sudan drone warfare kills thousands as both sides secure advanced technology", Sudan Tribune, 17 February 2026, see https://sudantribune.com/article/310795 , "Sudan: RSF Downs Turkish-Made Bayraktar Akıncı Combat Drone Near El-Fasher", African Security Analysis, 9 October 2025, see https://www.africansecurityanalysis.org/updates/sudan-rsf-downs-turkish-made-bayraktar-akinci-combat-drone-near-el-fasher (all webpages visited on 7 July 2026).

[88] See https://x.com/AfriMEOSINT/status/1943276670317691195 (10 July 2025) and Kazim Abdul, "Akinci drone downed in Sudan", Military Africa, 15 July 2025, see https://www.military.africa/2025/07/akinci-drone-downed-in-sudan/ (visited at 7 July 2026).

[89] See https://x.com/AfriMEOSINT/status/1963600203438576041 (4 September 2025) and https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/rsf-down-turkish-made-drone-in-south-darfur (visited on 30 June 2026).

[90] Imagery was posted at RSF's own Telegram-page: https://t.me/RSFSudan/8378 (8 January 2026) and reposted at https://x.com/AfriMEOSINT/status/2009333382761865413 (8 January 2026) and at https://x.com/SigintMap/status/2058552433421189433 (24 May 2026); Night footage of celebrating RSF combatants near the drone is posted at https://x.com/war_noir/status/2009606103638659465 (9 January 2026) (pages visited on 7 July 2026).

68. Although the Panel is yet to verify the veracity of the RSF claims linked to the 10 July and 4 September 2025 incidents, it is certain that the 8 January 2026 drone was downed in Darfur, not near Nyala but approximately 23 km south-east of El-Fasher.[91] In addition, the Panel was able to confirm that this particular drone was deployed by SAF.[92]

3. One-Way Attack (OWA) Drones

69. While the publicly available evidence regarding the use of OWAs was scarce,[93] the Panel reviewed photographic evidence confirming OWAs deployment in Sudan in general and Darfur in particular.[94] In addition, the Panel analysed a satellite image confirming the presence of at least 40 such drones on 4 March 2026 in a field north-west of Nyala airport (see Annex 15). The Panel was yet to establish the exact type and make of those OWAs.

4. Multirotor Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (MUAVs)

70. The Panel reviewed a limited number of publicly available video footage of MUAVs present in Sudan and that were used almost certainly by both SAF and RSF.[95] The Panel gathered credible evidence that during the eighteen months urban warfare in El Fasher RSF used MUAVs drones.[96] (See Chapter III B and Annex 6) Various eyewitnesses reported that RSF used these to drop mortar grenades on civilians.

71. The Panel continues to investigate the scale, prevalence, operational deployment, and provenance of all of the above-mentioned drones, including the munitions used, where relevant. The deployment, presence and operation of military drones within Darfur fall within the scope of the arms embargo, as imposed by the Security Council in paragraph 7 of resolution 1556 (2004).

B. Civilian impact from the use of armed drones: January to June 2026[97]

[91] Detailed geolocated analysis was provided by a confidential source and reviewed by the Panel, June 2026.

[92] The Panel verified the geolocated images, confidential source information, June 2026. In July 2026, confidential Member State sources indicated that it is very likely that SAF is deploying this type of drones.

[15] The Panel's findings are consistent with: "RSF Preparing Large-Scale Suicide Drone Fleet for Launch in Nyala", Yale School of Public Health - Humanitarian Research Lab, 29 September 2025, see https://ysph.yale.edu/download-file/6aa8a82a-24eb-4e6c-bc85-d8700c5cc01e "Identification of New RSF UAV Launch Site in Nyala", Yale School of Public Health - Humanitarian Research Lab, 6 February 2026, see https://ysph.yale.edu/download-file/b2e415be-9df9-483b-a20e-b682fd06b12d/ and "Sudan: Abusive Warring Parties Acquire New Weapons - Renew, Expand UN Arms Embargo", Human Rights Watch, 9 September 2024, see https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/09/09/sudan-abusive-warring-parties-acquire-new-weapons (all webpages visited on 7 July 2026).

[94] Confidential source provided the Panel with images of these drones which the Panel reviewed, June 2026.

[95] Open-source footage examples: https://t.me/fastsupport88/5852 (21 April 2024) and https://x.com/war_noir/status/1991931673856872590 (21 November 2025).

[96] Eyewitness statements, detailed reports from various organizations, confidential sources and social media posts, including the following three: https://x.com/africaken1/status/1856467540693709137 (12 November 2024); https://x.com/war_noir/status/1925191007831801978 (21 May 2025); and https://x.com/war_noir/status/1927115892363542854 (26 May 2025) (all webpages visited on 7 July 2026).

[97] For consistency and readability, the term armed drones will be used throughout this section. This term refers to unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), which is the formal technical designation.

72. Between January and May 2026, more than 1,000 civilians were killed in drone strikes in Sudan.[98] The epicentre of drone warfare shifted to Kordofan and Darfur, where the SAF and the RSF deployed armed drones. As the Panel's mandate is confined to the territory of Darfur, its analysis of compliance with international humanitarian law was limited to strikes that had an impact in Darfur.

73. Following the RSF's takeover of El Fasher in October 2025, it exercised territorial control over most of Darfur. The totality of the available evidence, including the operational context, technical analysis, and information from confidential sources, indicates that the drone strikes were carried out by SAF.

74. Since January 2026, the Panel has been recording drone attacks in Darfur[99] and observed a significant increase and widespread use of armed drones and a consequent considerable increase in civilian deaths across the state. Armed drones hit targets remotely, without combatants taking part in the offensives. Such dynamics caused an immediate increase in civilian casualties and injuries, including women and children.

75. SAF drone munitions hit densely populated civilian areas, civilian gatherings, markets and civilian objects and infrastructure, including a hospital, which must be protected at all times under IHL. Highlighting the severity of the impact on civilians, in one hospital, the Zalingei Teaching Hospital, Central Darfur, MSF treated over 80 people, including six women and children, injured by drone strikes between January to early May 2026.[100]

76. The Panel documented continued SAF strikes against urban centres, in particular Nyala, a populated city with a roughly estimated population of over 1 million inhabitants, where RSF lived embedded among the civilian population. The case studies below highlight the widespread nature of SAF drone attacks and their illegality under international humanitarian law. It is worth noting that all locations reported in the case studies were previously hit by SAF airstrikes in 2024 (see Panel final report S/2025/239 para.54).

77. Both the SAF and the RSF have distinct obligations under international humanitarian law to prevent civilian harm: SAF in conducting attacks and the RSF in taking feasible precautions to protect civilians in territory under its control.[101] In the case studies below, SAF failed to distinguish between military objectives and civilians, or to take sufficient precautions to avoid civilian harm and to verify that targets were neither civilians nor civilian objects, in violation of international humanitarian law. In various cases civilians, civilian objects and infrastructure appear to have been intentionally targeted. In addition, information

[98] OHCHR 15 June 2026, 61nd Human Rights Council Session, see: https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2026/06/deputy-high-commissioner-dabo-sudan-cannot-be-forgotten

[99] The Panel used various reliable confidential sources to document alleged drone strikes. The verification of strikes was done a via triangulation of at least four different types of sources including: local interlocutors and eyewitnesses, open-source secondary reporting, verified user-generated content, and satellite imagery confirming damage on the ground.

[100] MSF 1 June 2026, see: https://x.com/msf_sudan/status/2061388680611110985?s=51

[101] Customary international humanitarian law prohibits attacks against civilians and civilian objects. Parties to the conflict must distinguish between civilians and combatant and may direct attacks only against military objectives. Parties must take all feasible precautions to verify targets and avoid, or in any event minimize, incidental civilian harm. In case of doubt, civilian status must be presumed and the party refrain from attack. ICRC Customary IHL Rules 1, 6, 7, 15, 16. Customary international humanitarian law also requires parties to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects under their control from the effects of attacks, including by avoiding the placement of military objectives within or near densely populated areas. ICRC Customary IHL Rules 22, 23, 24.

received indicated that RSF personnel integrated into civilian areas, practices that increased risks to civilians and violated obligations to distinguish combatants from the civilian population and to take precautions to protect civilians from the effects of hostilities.[102]

C. SAF drone attacks across Darfur

1. SAF drone strike on hospital in East Darfur[103]

78. On 20 March 2026, SAF drones hit El Daein Teaching Hospital in East Darfur twice, killing approximately 70 people, including seven women and 13 children and injuring 146 people.[104] Health workers were among those killed. The hospital was the main access to healthcare and a referral hospital for over two million civilians.[105] Furthermore, a SAF airstrike hit the same hospital on 20 August 2024, killing at least 11 civilians including women and children (see Panel final report S/2025/239).

79. Under customary international humanitarian law, medical personnel and hospitals must be respected and protected at all times and must not be made the object of attacks.[106] SAF formally denied the targeting of the hospital (see Annex 16).

2. SAF drone strikes on markets and populated civilian areas across Darfur:[107]

80. On 8 March 2026, in Nyala, South Darfur, the Al-Junaynah market in the west of the city was hit. At least 11 civilians were killed and 20 injured.

81. On 25 March 2026, a market in Saraf Umbrah, North Darfur was hit, killing 22 civilians and injuring 17. The market is an important civilian economic centre.

82. On 8 April 2026, a civilian gathering in Kutum, North Darfur, was hit. At least 30 people were killed, although estimates vary. Deaths included women and children.

83. On 12 April 2026, an active market in El Geneina, West Darfur, was hit. Approximately 9 people were killed.

84. On 27 April 2026, Al Hamidiya IDP Camp in Zalingei, Central Darfur, was hit, leading to 15 injuries, including women and children.

3. Vital civilian infrastructure hit in West Darfur and humanitarian aid targeted

[102] ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Rules 1, 7, 22, 23, 24.

[103] Drone strikes were verified through triangulation of at least four types of sources including: local independent sources and eyewitnesses, open-source reporting, geolocated and verified user-generated content, and satellite imagery confirming ground damage consistent with the specific airstrike.

[104] Interviews with local monitors on the ground and WHO, 23 March 2026 see https://www.unognewsroom.org/story/en/3065/sudan-hospital-attack-who-ohchr.

[105] Ibid.

[106] ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rules 25 and 28.

[107] Drone strikes were verified through triangulation of at least four types of sources including: local independent sources and eyewitnesses, open-source reporting, geolocated and verified user-generated content, and satellite imagery confirming ground damage consistent with the specific airstrike.

85. Drone attacks disrupted humanitarian aid access routes and targeted humanitarian response.

86. On 9 June 2026, Ardamatta bridge, in West Darfur, was damaged by a drone attack. In June, the bridge which was used for civilian movement and essential for humanitarian access connecting El Geneina to the rest of Darfur, was targeted twice.[108]

87. On 24 April 2026, a UNHCR aid truck on its way to Tawila, North Darfur, was hit in a drone attack, destroying all the assistance it carried for displaced families.[109] This drone strike could not be attributed with high degree of certainty.

88. Under customary international humanitarian law, parties to a conflict must respect and protect humanitarian relief personnel, objects and operations, and allow and facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of impartial humanitarian assistance for civilians in need.[110]

89. The Panel addressed an official letter to the Government of the Sudan but was yet to receive a response.

V. Regional dynamics

90. By mid-2026, the regional dimension of the war in Sudan had expanded, and the risk of conflict spillover into neighbouring countries materialized, particularly affecting the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Libya, and South Sudan. The security situation in cross-border areas neighbouring Darfur continued to deteriorate as armed groups linked to the conflict in Sudan used these areas for logistics and the manoeuvring of forces. More broadly, all neighbouring States had their own interests and security concerns related to the ongoing war in Sudan. Regional mediation efforts, consisting of QUAD, Quintet, IGAD, AU failed to achieve a breakthrough, as they remained limited in their engagement with the principal parties to the conflict (See Annex 17). The belligerents continued to regard military victory as the only viable means of ending the war. SAF and RSF maintained fundamentally polarized visions for Sudan's future, closely linked to their respective existential interests.

A. Libya

91. During the reporting period, the security situation along the Libya-Sudan border deteriorated significantly, with cross-border supply routes increasingly shaping conflict dynamics in both countries. From autumn 2025, established supply routes in the border areas contributed to the RSF's capture of El Fasher. On 13 November 2025, Libyan Arab Armed forces (LAAF) and the Chadian National Army (ANT) established a joint border force to improve security along the Libya-Chad border.111 In meetings with Egyptian authorities in December 2025 and January 2026, Khalifa Haftar and Saddam Haftar discussed measures to address the deteriorating security situation in southern Libya, focusing in particular on the

[108] Interviews with organizations operating on the ground and confidential sources, May-June 2026.

[109] UNHCR condemns attack on aid truck in North Darfur, see: https://www.unhcr.org/africa/news/press-releases/unhcr-condemns-attack-aid-truck-north-darfur.

[110] ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Rules 32, 55.

[111] "Libya & Chad Launch Joint Border Force", 14 November 2026, see https://libyareview.com/60902/libya-chad-launch-joint-border-force/. LAAF was headed by general Khalifa Haftar.

Karab El Tum triangle, which RSF used as a logistics corridor into Sudan. By early 2026, the joint border force was attempting to disrupt RSF convoys destined for Darfur.[112]

92. The Libyan component of the joint force was formed from the Subul al-Salam battalion.[113] Throughout 2025, the battalion attacked Sudanese Joint Forces logistics units in Kufra District, south Libya and facilitated the movement of RSF convoys into North Darfur. However, on 13 February 2026, Khalifa Haftar dissolved the battalion and reconstituted it as the Subul al-Salam Light Infantry Brigade, distancing it from RSF. From February 2026, the Brigade sought to prevent RSF convoys from reaching North Darfur. The Panel confirmed that Tubu communities of southern Libya, through their commercial ties with the Rizeigat community, continued to facilitate the movement of RSF convoys.[114]

93. By May 2026, several Darfurian armed groups were present in Southern Libya:[115]

(a) Sudan Liberation Army – Minni Minawi (SLA-MM), comprising 100 to 120 Zaghawa fighters and up to 40 vehicles, based to the south of Sabha (Libya) with area of movement from Sabha to Bahai – Tiné (Eastern Chad);

(b) Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF, Al Hadi Idris Yahya faction), comprising 30 to 40 Fur fighters, 7-10 vehicles, based to the south of Sabha;

(c) group of Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, JEM defectors, comprising 40 to 55 fighters and up to 15 vehicles, based to the south of Kufra.

94. The Panel verified the following RSF logistic routes used to facilitate the movement from southern Libya into North and West Darfur:

(a) Ma'tan as-Sarra Oasis (Kufra district) – Kornoi- Wadi Howar – Zuruk – Bir Mirgui;

(b) Ma'tan as-Sarra Oasis (Kufra district) – Karab El Tum – Al Altroun – Adré – El Geneina

(c) Al Kufra – Al Altroun – Karab El Tum – Jebel Uweinat mountains – Mellit – Tawila – Saraf Umrah – El Geneina;

(d) Al Kufra – Saraf Umrah – Kabkabiyah – Sortaani – El Geneina; and

(e) Al Kufra southeast – Jebel Uweinat mountains – Hamra El Sheikh.

B. Chad

[112] Interviews with joint forces high-ranking officers, diplomats, former SLA/AW members, SLA/MM active members in Cairo, Kampala, Nairobi, Juba, May-June 2026. See also: "Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defense and Military Production, and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Meet the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan National Army", 11 January 2026: https://www.mod.gov.eg/modwebsite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=45739.

[113] The Subul al-Salam Battalion is a Salafist armed group operating in the Kufra district of southern Libya and affiliated with the LAAF.

[114] Interviews with Sudanese joint forces active members, former SLA/AW members, SLA/MM active members, traders from North Darfur in Kampala, Cairo, Juba, Nairobi in April-June 2026. See also: "LNA restructures Sibul-Al Salam brigade", 13 February 2026, see: https://libyasecuritymonitor.com/lna-restructures-subul-al-salam-brigade/.

[115] Interviews with RSF acting members, former SLA/AW members, Fur ethnic community diaspora, traders from North Darfur in Kampala, Nairobi, Juba, Nyala, April –May 2026.

95. Two factors remained significant security concerns for Chad. The first stemmed from cross-border insecurity. Following an RSF attack on Chadian Armed Forces (ANT) positions on 21 February 2026, renewed clashes between RSF and the Joint Forces killed five Chadian soldiers and three civilians and injuring 12 civilians in Tiné, Chad.[116] On 23 February 2026, Chad closed its borders with Sudan following "repeated incursions and violations committed by the warring parties in Sudan on Chadian territory".[117] Chad treated the situation as a threat to territorial security. Cross-border violence continued in March 2026, when a drone strike originating from Sudan hit Tiné in Chad, killing 17 civilians. The attack highlighted the increasing risk of cross-border spillover into Chad.

96. The second factor concerned the security implications of the Zaghawa issue in Eastern Chad. The representatives of the Zaghawa Supreme Council, including its head Saleh Abdellah Ahmed Bahar, met President Mahamat Idriss Deby in N'Djamena on 26 February 2026 amid continued RSF military pressure and the close ties between Zaghawa community and Chadian political elites. The Council expressed concern over the Chadian authorities' lack of practical response to RSF activities in eastern Chad and Dar Zaghawa was the absence of practical reaction of Chadian authorities to RSF military activities in eastern Chad and Dar Zaghawa. The meeting did not produce a mutually acceptable outcome.[118]

97. In late February 2026, the ANT reinforced positions along Am Djarass – Tiné – Adré. In early March 2026, it launched a weapons collection campaign from Tiné to disarm Zaghawa self-defence groups and strengthen control over cross-border movements.[119] Tiné remained strategically important as a border crossing, while the Joint Forces controlled only a part of the town, RSF controlled approximately 75% of the Al Tina district in Sudan. The competition over these routes contributed to clashes and further cross-border instability.

98. Continued RSF attacks in the Dar Zaghawa increased recruitment into the Joint Forces among Chadian Zaghawa and refugees who fled from Um Baru Um Baru – Tiné – Kornoi to Chad's Ouaddaï and Wadi Fira provinces. Panel investigations into ongoing RSF recruitment of Arab youth indicated that recruitment primarily targeted the Rizeigat, Salamat and Ta'aisha communities in the cross-border areas of Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira and Salamat provinces. Most recruitment operations in Eastern Chad were coordinated Habib Hareka, a member of the Misseriya community.[120]

99. RSF's partial control of the tri-border area between Sudan, Chad, and CAR strengthened its cross/border logistics networks into Darfur. Following its capture of Um Dukhun in Central Darfur in December 2025, RSF rehabilitated and paved sections of the road through the Al-Mazlaqan area linking the town with Chad and CAR. The route facilitated the movement of traders transporting gum arabic and charcoal from Sangho region into Chad, from whom RSF collected taxes.[121] The following routes were used by

[117] "Chad closes frontier with Sudan after five of its soldiers killed in clashes in border town", 23 February 2026, see https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/02/23/chad-closes-frontier-with-sudan-after-five-of-its-soldiers-killed-in-clashes-in-border-town.

[118] Interviews with JEM high-ranking officers, members of Zaghawa community, active Joint Forces members, former SLA/AW members, traders from North Darfur in Kampala, Cairo, Juba, Nairobi, January-May 2026.

[119] Ibid.

[120] Interviews with Zaghawa, Fur community leaders, former SLA/AW members, Joint Forces high-ranking officers, traders from North Darfur, in Kampala, Cairo, Juba, Nairobi, January-May 2026.

[121] Interviews with Fulani community members, traders from South Darfur, Central African armed opposition members, in Kampala, Birao, Umm Dafog, Nairobi, May-June 2026.

RSF to move convoys from southern Libya through eastern Chad and into North and West Darfur:

(a) Rebiana (Southern Libya, Kufra district) – Al Sarra – Am Djarass – Bir Mirgui;

(b) Al Kufra (Southern Libya) – Karab El Tum – Al Altroun- Adré – El Geneina;

(c) Adikong – Adré – El Geneina;

(d) Kulbus (Chad, Wadi Fira province) – Saraf Umrah – Jebel Amir – Kabkabiyah.

C. Central African Republic (CAR)

100. In February 2026, Sarra community in Vakaga province committed to provide security, resulting in the closure of the main overland road linking Birao, CAR and Umm Dafog, South Darfur. Since the outbreak of the conflict, this route had served as a principal overland logistics corridor for RSF supplies into South and West Darfur.[122] During February – March 2026, Sarra militia clashes sporadically with the Fulani community, which was heavily involved in illicit cross-border trade and RSF logistics. The closure of the route temporarily disrupted on of RSF's main cross-border supply corridors. The alliance with the Sarra community also enabled the Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA) to strengthen control over the strategic tri-border area linking Sudan, the CAR, and Chad. Despite these developments, the RSF continued recruiting in Vakaga province, particularly among the Salamat community. The Panel also identified the continued movemetns of RSF recruits along the route Hadjar Fatna (30 km to east of Birao) Majandare - Sam Ouandja – the tri-border area between CAR, Sudan and Chad-Nyala to reach South Darfur.[123] These developments indicated that, despite temporary disruptions to the principal overland logistics corridor in South Darfur, Vakaga province continued to play a critical role in RSF cross-border logistics and recruitment.

101. Under the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process, more than 1,260 former combatants of *Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) and Retour, Réclamation et Réhabilitation* (3R) were disarmed and demobilized since July 2025. The appointment of UPC leader Amadou Bi Aliou as Minister of Livestock and Animal Health was welcomed by UPC leader Mohammed Ali Darassa. However, a small group of UPC fighters from the Fulani community, led by General Mohammed Younis Khan, rejected the peace agreement and moved to the tri-border area, where they could potentially join the RSF, which had previously recruited fighters from the opposition in CAR.[124]

D. South Sudan

102. The security situation along the border with Sudan remained fragile. RSF maintained a presence in Western Bahr el Ghazal State (Kafia Kinji County), Unity State (Rubkona County), Upper Nile State (Maban, Renk and Fashoda Counties). However, the Panel found

[122] Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan (S/2024/65), (S/2025/239).

[123] Interviews with traders from South Darfur and CAR, SAF and Joint Forces officers, representatives of Central African armed groups in Um Dukhun, Kampala, Bangui, Port Sudan, Cairo, March-June 2026.

[124] Interviews with MINUSCA, representatives of Central African armed groups, members of Fulani community, traders from South Darfur, diplomats in Um Dukhun, Kampala, Bangui, Port Sudan, March-June 2026.

no evidence of clashes between RSF and the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) or the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) during the reporting period. The last incidents occurred in early 2025. In March 2026, an RSF led ambush on a SPLA-IO unit near Dukduk, approximately 50 kilometres southwest of Renk in Upper Nile State, killed several senior SPLA-IO officers.[125] In May 2025, RSF attacked an SPLA-IO base in Garia, Unity State, near the border with Sudan's West Kordofan State.[126]

103. The Panel received credible information from multiple sources that General Stephen Buay Rolnyang, head of the South Sudan People's Movement/Army (SSPM/A), was recruiting on behalf of RSF. His previous service as Commander of SSPDF 4th Infantry Division and of the SSPDF Military Police provided him with established links to SSPDF soldiers, facilitating recruitment. He primarily recruited in Rubkona and Mayom counties, Unity State, which are predominantly inhabited by the Nuer community. When contacted by the Panel, Stephen Buay did not deny his involvement in the recruiting for the RSF but stated he did not receive any material benefit from the activity.[127]

E. Regional fuel and oil developments

1. Heglig oil field

104. On 10 December 2025, the Government of South Sudan reached a tripartite agreement with SAF and RSF placing Heglig oil field in West Kordofan under the protection of the SSPDF.[128] Between 13 and 16 December 2025, South Sudan's Presidential Adviser on Security Affairs, Tut Gatluak, visited Port Sudan to discuss security arrangements for the Heglig oil infrastructure. Sudan and South Sudan agreed to establish a joint economic committee, co-chaired by the Sudanese Prime Minister and the Vice President of South Sudan, to oversee management of the oil field.[129]

105. The agreement reflected a convergence of interests among otherwise opposing actors around the protection of critical oil infrastructure. Processing approximately 130,000 barrels per day, the facility accounted for 76 per cent of South Sudan's oil production and remained critical energy infrastructure for both countries. For South Sudan, the agreement helped safeguard oil exports while balancing relations with both SAF and RSF, thereby reducing the risk of direct military confrontation around Heglig. It also supported Juba's ability to fulfil oil forward contracts, a key source of revenue. For RSF, military presence around Heglig provided strategic leverage over essential infrastructure, given the limited technical capacity of both Sudan and South Sudan to restore damaged oil facilities. For the Government of Sudan, uninterrupted oil transit through Heglig ensured continued transit revenues and fuel supplies to Port Sudan, supporting SAF operations.

[125] General Biel Goanar, Major General Gatwech Gai, Brigadier General Peter ParjiekToang.

[126] Interviews with senior SPLA-IO officers, Sudanese and South Sudanese traders, civil society activists, Nuer community members in Bentui, Kampala, Nairobi, Juba in April-May 2026.

[127] Interviews with UNMISS, members of Nuer community, SPLA-IO veterans, SAF, RSF, in Nairobi, Kampala, Addis-Ababa, Port-Sudan, Nyala, Juba, March-May 2026.

[128] "Govt reaches an agreement with SAF and RSF to place Heglig security under SSPDF", 11 December 2025, see https://mictps.gov.ss/govt-reaches-an-agreement-with-saf-rsf-to-place-heglig-security-under-sspdf/.

[129] "Sudan, South Sudan agree on joint economic committee, Heglig oil coordination", 16 December 2025, see https://sudantribune.com/article/308282.

106. The Heglig arrangements marked a further regionalization of the conflict by drawing South Sudan into the security management of strategic infrastructure inside Sudan, while highlighting that economic interests could outweigh military confrontation where critical oil infrastructure was concerned. By June 2026, oil production and transit continued uninterrupted, and Nilepet engineering teams retained access to Heglig under an agreement with Sudan's Ministry of Energy and Petroleum.[130]

2. Fuel supplies to RSF through Abyei Special Administrative Area

107. RSF used Abyei Special Administrative Area ("Abyei") as a key supply route for procuring and transporting fuel. It's military presence in Abyei, established in mid-autumn 2025, coincided with the seasonal migration of Misseriya Arab nomads, many of whom served within RSF infantry, enabling the RSF to conceal its deployment within customary population movements.

108. RSF primarily purchased fuel from the Amiet market (Suk Al-Naam) which was supplied by South Sudanese traders via Kuajok, Warrap state. Diesel sold for USD 28 per jerrican and USD 280 per drum.[131] RSF established outposts near the Suk Al-Naam and along the route north at Goli and Diffra to secure its supply chain. The main logistics route ran from: Suk Al-Naam – Goli – Allal - Pandal- Farouk before entering West Kordofan State, where fuel was transported to RSF depots in Muglad. From Muglad, supplies supported RSF operations towards Babanousa and Nyala, South Darfur.[132] Fuel also reached Nyala via an alternative trade route through Juba-Wau- Raja –Kafia Kinji area (Western Bahr al Ghazal state).[133] These developments underscored Abyei's continued strategic importance as a cross-border logistics hub sustaining RSF operations in Darfur and West Kordofan.

F. RSF overland and aerial supply routes


109. The map below provides overland and aerial supply routes used by the RSF that have been verified by the Panel of Experts in the above analysis and over the past three years (see S/2025/239, paras. 95–99; S/2024/65, paras. 41–52). The routes are illustrative and non-exhaustive. RSF logistical networks are adaptive, with supply routes shifting in response to military developments, access constraints, supplies and operational requirements.

[130] Interviews with senior SAF officers, Sudanese oil traders, Nilepet personnel, diplomats, RSF active members, South Sudan opposition members in Kampala, Cairo, Juba, Nairobi, Port Sudan, February- June 2026.

[131] The volume of 1 drum of fuel is 208 litres; the volume of 1 jerrycan of fuel is 20 litres.

[132] Interviews with traders from South, East Darfur and Juba, SAF officers, RSF active member, members of Misseriya community, in Kampala, Nairobi, Juba, Adré, Nyala, April-June 2026.

[133] Interviews with traders, RSF members, SAF officers, SPLA-IO senior officers, members of the Misseriya community and diplomats across Darfur and in Port Sudan, Kampala, Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Juba April-June. 2026. The volume of 1 drum of fuel is 208 litres; the volume of 1 jerrycan of fuel is 20 litres.


Rebiana
Al Kufra
Kufra district
LIBYA
EGYPT
Ma'tan as-Sarra
Oasis
Al Altroun
Al Sarra
SUDAN
Am Djarass
Wadi
Howar
Zuruk
CHAD
Kornoi
Darfur
Karab
El Tum
Jebel
Amir
Kulbus
Mellit
Bir Mirgui
El-Fasher
El-Obeid
Adré
Saraf
Umrah
Kabkabiyah
El-Geneina
Nyala
Farouk
Kadugli
Muglad
Hadjar Fatna
Majandare
Suk Al Na'am
Abyei
= Abyei Special Administrative Area
Sam Ouandja
C.A.R.
SOUTH SUDAN
Source: The Panel of Experts on the Sudan, July 2026

VI. Weapons and impact in Darfur

110. The Panel investigations were conducted from 26 May until 29 June 2026, focusing on the use of uncrewed combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs, commonly known as drones) by both RSF and SAF in Darfur (See analysis above). In addition, the Panel investigated air-delivered munitions, armoured personnel carriers (APCs), as well as flights transporting military materiel and fighters into Darfur. Any activity involving movement of military materiel into Darfur fall within the scope of the arms embargo, as imposed by Security Council in para 7 of resolution 1556 (2004).

A. Air-Delivered Munitions: free fall bombs

111. In its final report S/2025/239[134], the Panel documented 140 airstrikes conducted by SAF which hit 20 urban areas in Darfur, including Zamzam IDP camp and Kutum in North Darfur. During this mandate, the Panel identified three bombs from those airstrikes dropped on Zamzam IDP camp and Kutum, North Darfur in August 2024. All three bombs failed to explode upon impact and at least two had been deformed.[135]

112. A grey bomb with long tail fins that were deformed was discovered in Zamzam camp on 7 August 2024. The Panel has determined that its tail fins are consistent with those of the ADB 100 air demolition bomb.[136] This ADB 100, a 100 kg free-fall bomb, was also identified as the type that has been extensively reported on during previous mandates[137] when it was referred to as Improvised Air-Delivered Munition (IADM). The ADB 100 is lacking the typical suspension lugs with the objective of being rolled out of cargo aircraft featuring an aft loading ramp.

113. Another unexploded bomb in Kutum on 13 August 2024 penetrated the earth's surface, leaving only its tail sticking above the ground. The Panel has identified this munition as a FAB-250 M54 aircraft bomb.

114. A free-fall bomb that failed to explode was identified in Zamzam IDP camp on 5 August 2024. It is very likely a ADB 250, a 250 kg air demolition bomb produced in Sudan. This munition is characterized by six tail fins connected to both an inner and an outer ring.[138]

115. The Panel continues to investigate the scale, prevalence, operational deployment, and provenance of all these munitions where relevant. The deployment of air-delivered munitions within Darfur fall within the scope of the arms embargo, as imposed by Security Council in paragraph 7 of resolution 1556 (2004).

[134] Paragraph 54 and 55, and figure III

[135] The Panel verified, analysed, and geolocated four images of air delivered munitions.

[136] Defence Industries System MASAD – Sudan at: https://masad-ex.com/product/adb-100-100-kg-air-demolition-bomb/; See Annex 18

[137] Panel reports S/2014/87 paragraphs. 107-115, Annex V; S/2015/31 paragraphs 124-129; and S/2016/805 paragraphs 107-118.

[138] Defence Industries System MASAD – Sudan at: https://masad-ex.com/product/adb-250-250-kg-air-demolition-bomb/; See Annex 19

B. Unidentified Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs)

116. In late October 2025, a new armoured personnel carrier (APC) used by RSF appeared on social media.[139] In the first half of 2026, the APCs appeared in larger numbers in Darfur.[140] The Panel has credible information that these APCs were either custom built or modified (see Annex 20). Following close analysis, the Panel considers these APCs to most likely be made in the UAE, transported by cargo ship to Libya, then driven into to Sudan.[141]

117. The deployment, presence and operation of APCs in Darfur fall within the scope of the arms embargo, as imposed by Security Council in para 7 of resolution 1556 (2004). The Panel continues investigating the case and the chain of custody.

C. Flights into Darfur performed by cargo aircraft

118. The Panel reviewed footage posted on social media of a white aircraft in flight, reportedly filmed near Nyala probably in January 2026 or at the very beginning of February 2026.[142] The Panel identified the aircraft as Ilyushin Il-76 and Boeing 727-200.[143]

119. Boeing Model 727 was built in vast numbers,[144] but at present day, there are only 20 to 30 Boeing 727-200s active worldwide, almost exclusively in service as freighters,[145] making it a rare type of aircraft. The Panel confirmed that Boeing 727-200s began appearing at the at the military apron at N'Djamena International Airport, Chad, since 1 November 2024.[146] The Panel confirmed that by May 2026, three Boeing 727-200 aircraft were based at N'Djamena (see Annex 21 and 22).

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[139] APCs in use with the RSF were posted on social media from 31 October 2025; see: https://x.com/BuschModelar/status/1984402188387418366; Earliest source of the new APC in Libyan service; see: https://x.com/LeanderJobse/status/1988331597956026521 (11 November 2025) (both pages visited on 7 July 2026).

[140] The Panel verified and geolocated footage confirming the presence of these APCs in Nyala. To confirm the APCs the Panel analysed various open-source content videos and photos see: https://x.com/afrimeosint/status/2059639945103344017 (posted May 2026); https://x.com/afrimeosint/status/2063605993221607697 (posted 7 June 2026) https://x.com/Special_Tasks12/status/2067955616996327800/video (posted 19 June 2026) (visited 7 July 2026); https://x.com/alipolitics1/status/2072511557095829632 (posted July 2, visited 7 July 2026).

[141] See Annex 3 on probability estimates methodology.

[142] Videoclips and images of airborne aircraft see: https://x.com/AfriMEOSINT/status/2018471326454067690 (posted on 2 February 2026) and https://x.com/AfriMEOSINT/status/2018497150049521827 (posted on 3 February 2026) (visited on 7 July 2026).

[143] The Boeing 727-200 is the stretched version, featuring a fuselage that is 20ft (6.10 m) longer than the -100 series

[144] 1832 units built between 1962 and 1984, see http://www.boeing.com/commercial/ 727family/ (visited on 1 July 2026).

[145] See https://www.aerotransport.org/ searched for Boeing 727, with the search narrowed down on the stretched 727-200 series (visited on 1 July 2026).

[146] The Panel accessed and analysed multiple satellite images taken up 8 June 2026 and corroborated the information with publicly available flight data covering the period 31 October 2024 up till 30 April 2026. See also OSINT researcher post on X see: https://x.com/AfriMEOSINT/status/2001062300254437698 (posted on 16 December 2025, visited on 7 July 2026).

120. The Panel investigated the provenance of these aircrafts and found that one of them – manufacture's serial number (MSN) 22438, and formerly registered as PR-TTW147 left Brazilian territory for Africa[148] on 29 October 2024 and arrived on 30 October or 1 November 2024 in N'Djamena.[149] In addition, the Panel has ascertained that two more Boeing 727-200Fs followed. The first Boeing 727-200F – MSN 21951, formerly as registered as N726CK.[150] This aircraft left the United States on 25 May 2025 and arrived in N'Djamena on 29 May 2025.[151] The second Boeing 727-200F - MSN 22252 and formerly registered as N725CK[152] - left the United States on 28 April 2026 and arrived the next day in N'Djamena.

121. Ever since their arrival in N'Djamena, there has not been any movement logged of these three aircraft. The Panel suspects that they were taking deliberate steps to avoid detection while in flight. According to confidential sources verified by the Panel, multiple Boeing 727-200Fs (and some Ilyushin Il-76s) were landing in Nyala at night from January to July 2026.[153] The Panel verified that at least one of these aircraft was frequently flying between N'Djamena and Nyala.[154] The Panel received reliable information from four sources that the aircraft had transported RSF fighters and mercenaries, as well as military equipment, including drones and weapons.[155] The Panel received preliminary information regarding the ownership of the two above-mentioned Boeing 727-200Fs, but it cannot conclude with certainty the chain of custody, and it continues to investigate.

[147] Information retrieved from www.aerotransport.org : PR-TTW was a Boeing 727-225(F) with MSN 22438; the aircraft was parked on 23 September 2024 (retrieved 1 July 2026).

[148] Gabriel Benevides, "Boeing 727 ex-Total Cargo begins farewell to Brazil", Aeroflap, 29 October 2024, see https://www.aeroflap.com.br/en/boeing-727-ex-total-cargo-inicia-despedida-do-brasil/, and "Boeing 727 Active Fleet Tracking"; see https://www.airliners.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1493539 (page 2); Instagram post of the aircraft before departure; see: https://www.instagram.com/p/DBwS52OuxUa/ ; and https://globe.adsbexchange.com/ (visited 7 July 2026).

[149] Redação FLAP, "727 da Total deixará o Brasil e seguirá para a Africa", Flap International, 29 October 2024, see https://flapinternational.com.br/ aviacao-comercial/727-da-total-deixara-o-brasil-e-seguira-para-a-africa and data retrieved from www.aerotransport.org data for PR-TTW (visited 7 July 2026).

[150] See www.aerotransport.org : N726CK is a Boeing 727-2M7(F) with MSN 21951; parked on 5 February 2024 (information retrieved on 1 July 2026).

[151] "Boeing 727 Active Fleet Tracking"; see: https://www.airliners.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1493539 (page 3-5) (visited 1 July 2026), flight data retrieved from https://www.flightradar24.com/ and https://globe.adsbexchange.com/ for N726CK.

[152] See www.aerotransport.org : N725CK is a Boeing 727-224(F) (W) with MSN 22252; it was parked on 1 May 2023 (retrieved 1 July 2026).

[153] Communication with sources with direct knowledge of air traffic movements in Nyala, June and July 2026.

3 August 2025 a YouTube video clip depicting a Boeing 727-200 landing at Nyala Airport, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MGNsTZO_Fs8 ; The colour scheme of the aircraft is consistent with the colour scheme of MSN 21951, see Annex 22

[155] Communication with two eyewitnesses Nyala airport, June and July 2026; documentation from two Member States, May, June and July 2026

VII. Recommendations

To the Security Council:

122. With regard to international humanitarian law and human rights law, modify the listing criteria in resolution 1591 (2005), paragraph 3 (c) to apply across Sudan.[156]

123. With regard to international humanitarian law and human rights law, add listing criteria regarding planning, directing, or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence.[157]

124. With regard to conflict financing, add listing criteria regarding abduction for ransom which finances armed groups.

125. With regard to the arms embargo, add the provision of armed mercenary personnel.[158]

To the Sanctions Committee:

126. Engage with the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Chad regarding the Panel's official mission to Chad.[159]

127. Engage with the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to request clarification regarding potential violations of the travel ban by Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo (SDi.008) and Al-Goney Hamdan Dagalo (SDi.011) as documented, and information on steps taken by Kenya to implement the travel ban.

[156] This recommendation is built on a three-prong rationale. Firstly, the epicentre of the war has shifted from Darfur to other parts of the Sudan as analysed in paragraph 16 of this report. Secondly, international humanitarian law and human rights law applies at all times. Lastly, violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law across Sudan may constitute a threat to the stability of Sudan and the region.

[157] This language can also be found in sanctions resolutions concerning Al Shabaab [resolution 2444 (2018) paragraph 50]; ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida [resolution 2734, paragraph 3]; Libya [resolution 2441 (2018), paragraph 11]; South Sudan [resolution 2521 (2020), paragraph 15(e)]; Haiti [resolution 2653 (2022), paragraph 16(f)]; and the Central African Republic [resolution 2399, para. 21(c)].

[158] This language can also be found in sanctions resolutions concerning Yemen [resolution 2216 (2015), paragraph 14] and South Sudan [resolution 2428 (2018), paragraph 5].

[159] The Panel is concerned that the Republic of Chad has not issued visas to the Panel for official missions in the past three years, despite the Panel's need to travel to Chad to effectively implement its mandate. In resolution 2791 (2025), the Council encouraged "[…] all parties and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations, to ensure continued cooperation with the Panel of Experts and the safety of its members."

Annexes

Annex 1: Cooperation and Non-Cooperation with the Panel

The Panel would like to acknowledge and thank the following Member States and UN entities for their cooperation regarding official missions: the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Republic of Kenya, the Republic of the Sudan, and the Republic of Uganda, the United Nations in Sudan, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

The Panel would like to note that the following Member States did not cooperate regarding the issuance of visas for official missions: the Republic of Chad, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, and the Republic of South Sudan. In the case of Chad, this represents the third consecutive mandate where the Panel has not received visas for an official mission.

Annex 2: Methodology

1. The Panel strived to adhere with the methodological standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997). Those standards call for reliance on verified documents and, wherever possible, on first-hand, on-site observations by the experts themselves, including photographs (paragraph 22). Furthermore, the Panel endeavoured to ensure that its assertions were corroborated by solid information and that its findings are substantiated by credible sources (paragraph 23).

2. To obtain firsthand information the Panel held meetings and conducted telephone interviews with a number of interlocutors, including members of the Government of the Sudan, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the Darfurian armed movements, both signatories and non-signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement, as well as representatives of civil society, including Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), refugees, victims and firsthand eyewitnesses of violence, women's organizations and members of local communities, journalists and local organizations. The Panel met with representatives from United Nations agencies, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and the diplomatic community.

3. When physical inspection was not possible, the Panel sought to corroborate information using multiple, independent sources to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard, placing a higher value on statements by principal actors and firsthand witnesses to events.

4. The Panel used satellite imagery procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations, as well as open-source imagery.

5. While the Panel wishes to be as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would have exposed them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel decided not to include identifying information in this document and instead relevant information was shared amongst at least two Panel members and is on file.

6. The Panel reviewed social media, but no information gathered was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.

7. The Panel used photographic evidence and footage received from various trusted sources, originally posted on social media including telegram, X accounts. All footage was time-corroborated and geolocated through cross-referencing and analysis of satellite imagery, provenance assessment, and visible and audible indicators within the footage. Events were corroborated through a combination of independent sources, including on the ground interlocutors, eyewitness accounts, and open-source reporting. Commander identities were established through a multi-factor assessment, including analysis of uniforms and insignia, visible physical and identifying features, verbal references within footage, and corroboration across multiple independent sources.

8. Drone strikes were verified through triangulation of at least four types of sources including: local independent sources and eyewitnesses, open-source reporting, geolocated and verified user-generated content, and satellite imagery confirming ground damage consistent with the specific airstrike.

9. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of the report, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of four out of the five members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or an entity, such recommendation would be done based on consensus.

10. The Panel is committed to impartiality in investigating incidents of breaches to the sanctions regime by all parties.

11. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, individuals or entities in most incidents that are covered. Their response is taken into consideration in any conclusive Panel's findings.


Annex 3: Probability Estimative Terminology and Indicative Probability Ranges

95–100%	Almost certain
75–94%	Highly likely
55–74%	Likely
45–54%	About as likely as not
25–44%	Unlikely
5–24%	Highly unlikely
0–4%	Remote chance

Annex 4: Fragmentation of Armed Groups


1. The origins of most the armed groups can be traced back to either the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), the Darfur Conflict (2003-2020) while other armed groups formed either as a response to the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir in April 2019 or within the context of the current conflict. The first category includes factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N); the second category includes the RSF, Revolutionary Awakening Council (RAC), and factions of the Gathering of the Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF), Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA); and the third category includes the Al Bara Ibn Malik Brigade, Sudan Shield Forces, and the Third Front (also known as Tamazuj). GSLF, JEM, SLA, and SPLM-N have subsequently split into various competing factions, which outlines armed group fragmentation). The fragmentation of armed groups has adverse implications for third party efforts toward conflict resolution as a multiplicity of actors increases the complexity of mediation.

Gathering of the Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF)[160]




[160] The Abdallah Janna and Tahir al-Hajar factions of GSLF split in March 2024.

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)[161]




[161] The Gibril Ibrahim and Suleiman Sandal factions of JEM split in August 2023. The Mohamed Bashara Yahya faction split from the Sulieman Sandal faction of JEM in February 2025.

Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)[162]



Sudan People's Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N)[163]



[162] The Minni Minawi and Abdel Wahid al-Nur factions of SLA split in 2005-2006. SLA-TC, led by El-Hadi Idris Yahya, split with the SLA-AW in 2015. The Mustafa Nasr al-Din Tambour faction split from SLA-AW in 2018. Osman Abdul Jabar faction split from the SLA-TC in January 2024.

[163] The Malik Agar and Abdelaziz al-Hilu factions of the SPLM-N split during March-October 2017.

Annex 5: Alignment of Armed Groups

1. Since the war erupted, almost all armed groups have since aligned with SAF or RSF in response to two key developments in 2023 and 2025.[164] The first critical juncture occurred in November 2023, when RSF military offensives and international humanitarian law violations against non-Arab populations in Darfur were a catalyst for four Darfur-based armed groups – now commonly known as the Joint Forces – to align with SAF.[165] The second critical juncture occurred in February 2025, when TASIS (also known as the Sudan Founding Alliance) was created prompting five armed groups to formally declare alignment with the RSF.[166]

Armed Group	Alignment
Al Bara Ibn Malik Brigade[167]	SAF
Gathering of the Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF)/Janna[168]	SAF
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)/Gibril[169]	SAF
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)/Yahya[170]	SAF
Revolutionary Awakening Council (RAC)[171]	SAF
Sudan Liberation Army – Minni Minawi (SLA-MM)[172]	SAF
Sudan Liberation Army – Tambour (SLA-Tambour)[173]	SAF

[164] Currently, only the Abdul Wahid faction of the SLA remains officially non-aligned.
[165] GSLF/Janna, JEM/Gibril, SLA/Minni Minawi, and SLA/TC–Jabar.
[166] GSLF/al-Hajar, JEM/Sandal, SLA-TC, SPLM-N/al-Hilu, and Tamazuj.
[167] The Al Bara Ibn Malik Brigade was formed in January 2020 and has fought alongside SAF since the outbreak of conflict in April 2023.
[168] GSLF Janna announced its support for SAF in November 2023.
[169] JEM Gibril announced its support for SAF in November 2023.
[170] JEM Yahya announced its support for SAF in April 2025.
[171] The Revolutionary Awakening Council was formed by Musa Hilal in January 2014. RAC announced cooperation with the joint forces in September 2025 and formal alignment with SAF in March 2026.
[172] SLA-MM announced its support for SAF in November 2023.
[173] SLA-Tambour announced its support for SAF in July 2023.

Sudan Liberation Army - Transitional Council (SLA – TC)/Jabar[174]	SAF
Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N)/Agar[175]	SAF
Sudan Shield Forces[176]	SAF
Sudan Liberation Army – Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW)[177]	Non-Aligned
Gathering of the Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF)/al-Hajar[178]	RSF
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)/Sandal[179]	RSF
Sudan Liberation Army – Transitional Council (SLA-TC)[180]	RSF
Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N)/al-Hilu[181]	RSF
Third Front/Tamazuj[182]	RSF

[174] SLA-TC/Jabar announced its support for SAF in November 2023.
[175] SPLM-N/Agar has supported SAF since the outbreak of conflict in April 2023.
[176] The Sudan Shield Forces were formed in late 2022. They were aligned with SAF at the outbreak of conflict in April 2023, defected to the RSF in August 2023, and then realigned with SAF in October 2024.
[177] SLA-AW has remained non-aligned since the outbreak of conflict in April 2023.
[178] Al-Hajar joined Tasis in September 2025 and confirmed in November 2025 that GSLF/al-Hajar had fought alongside the RSF at El Fasher.
[179] Sandal was a founding member of Tasis in February 2025 and he was subsequently appointed in July 2025 as Tasis interior minister.
[180] SLA-TC has supported RSF since March 2025.
[181] Al-Hilu was a founding member of Tasis in February 2025, and he was appointed in July 2025 as deputy leader. SPLM-N/al-Hilu has coordinated military efforts with the RSF as of late 2025.
[182] The Third Front, also known as Tamazuj, announced its support for the RSF in August 2023 and it joined Tasis in April 2025.

Annex 6: The RSF takeover of El Fasher

1. The city was surrounded by a sand barrier and trench, built by RSF during 2025. The wall controlled the entry and exit of the city, thus limiting trade, food and essential supplies to enter.[183] Civilians had extremely limited access to food, water and medical services. In September, famine was officially confirmed in the city.[184] There was no humanitarian access.[185] Furthermore, there was no safe passage for civilians as they faced severe risks when attempting to flee.[186]

2. From August until October 2025, RSF heavy artillery shelling and drone attacks intensified, targeting areas where civilians had displaced together with SAF and the Joint Force fighters, in Daraja Oula and Abu Shouk neighbourhoods, west and northwest of the city (see map below).[187] Civilian areas and civilian structures, including markets, places of worship and healthcare facilities where civilians frequented were hit. For example, Abu Gurun market in Daraja Oula was hit multiple times. Furthermore, on 19 September, Al Safiya mosque near the University was hit by a drone, killing at least 60 civilians, including children.[188] During this time, at least 260,000 civilians, including an estimated 130,000 children, remained trapped in the city.[189]

A. Mass detentions, ill treatment, torture and executions

(a) Hundreds of deaths during mass detention at the Children's Hospital[190]

3. In the early evening of 26 October, the detainees were made to walk to Garni. Between 4-7 trucks arrived and were filled with detainees, hundreds in each truck. The trucks returned to the east of El Fasher, to the Children's Hospital, now used as a prison (see

[183] Remote online video interviews with residents of El Fasher who lived in the city during the 18 months of urban warfare, November 2025-February 2026.

[184] Denying civilians access to food constitutes a violation of Customary International Humanitarian Law Rules 53-56. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation September 2025 see: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1159787/?iso3=SDN

[185] OCHA Sudan Humanitarian Access Snapshot August 2025 see https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-access-snapshot-august-2025

[186] Remote online video interviews with residents of El Fasher who lived in the city during the 18 months of urban warfare, November 2025-February 2026.

[187] Remote online video interviews with firsthand eyewitnesses displaced in Darfur, November 2025-February 2026.

[188] Remote and in person interviews with firsthand eyewitnesses displaced in Darfur and local monitors, November 2025-February, May 2026.

[189] Remote online video interviews with firsthand eyewitnesses displaced in Darfur, November 2025-February 2026. OCHA Sudan Humanitarian update August-September 2025 see https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-update-august-september-2025

[190] The Panel interviewed firsthand eyewitnesses who survived the detention at the Children's Hospital, November 2025-February 2026. Persons deprived of their liberty must be treated humanely and be protected from violence, torture, and cruel or inhuman treatment. The mass detention of men and youth, the ill treatment that may amount to torture, the inadequate conditions including lack of adequate food, lack of water and medical care resulting in deaths from cholera, may constitute violations of the Geneva Conventions Art. 3 and Customary International Humanitarian Law Rules 87, 89, 90, 118.

map above). Other trucks took detainees to Tagris prison in Nyala and to Zamzam IDP camp.

4. Approximately 3,000 to 4,000 prisoners were held at the hospital. Insufficient water was provided for the large number of prisoners resulting in detainees drinking wastewater. Detainees fell ill and during the next six days approximately 400 prisoners died of cholera. Following the deaths, RSF provided clean water, food and cholera medicine.

5. Those interviewed by the Panel spent between 5-14 days detained at the Children's Hospital. During this time, detainees were interrogated, insulted and beaten.[191] If RSF identified a detainee as SAF or Joint Force member, they would be executed. The Panel interviewed an eyewitness having been detained for 14 days until he was transferred to a separate group of prisoners in El Fasher that were to provide "general services" and "clean the streets" of the city. Such labour included collecting dead bodies from the various neighbourhoods and removing them from the city centre.

(b) Case study: Summary executions by RSF Commander Abu Lulu

6. The Panel reviewed and verified footage of RSF Commander Elfateh Abdullah Idris Adam (known as Abu Lulu) committing summary executions of men in civilian clothing.[192] Taking place on the 27 October, after the clashes described above, the Panel verified nine videos confirming Abu Lulu's activities at the sand wall and trench. In the footage, Abu Lulu summarily executed by multiple gunshots approximately 14 captured unarmed men in civilian clothing. In one video three men under 35 years were executed, and in a second video at least ten men lined up in a row were executed. In a third video, a young, injured man in civilian clothing, lying on the ground among various dead bodies, was executed. In additional footage, Abu Lulu is seen by the sand wall, loading his gun and shooting at least 15 scattered dead bodies, mostly youth and men, all in civilian clothing.

(c) El Fasher cases of conflict-related sexual violence against women and girls[193]

(i) Case 1:

7. I am 18 years old and fled from Daraja Oula through the west of the city. RSF abducted and held my mother, sisters, brothers and me in Saluma village for 20 days. RSF held us in houses. Men were put in separate rooms, and some were executed. RSF beat my mother and brothers with sticks. I was raped by various men. Some detainees paid to be

[191] *Falangayat* is a derogatory term used by RSF meaning subservient traitor.

[192] Civilians and persons *hors de combat*, including those detained or who have surrendered, are protected against attack under International Humanitarian Law. The killing of such persons constitutes violations of the Geneva Conventions Art. 3 and Customary International Humanitarian Law Rule 47.

[193] This section is based on over 30 testimonies, including remote online video interviews with survivors of sexual violence having fled El Fasher during the RSF takeover, and multiple interviews with reliable sexual and gender-based violence monitors and local monitors. The Panel used the terminology CRSV as sexual violence formed part of a wider pattern of violence and was occurring within a context of impunity in Darfur directly linked to the conflict.

released but my family had no money. After 20 days, we were released and walked for two days to reach a nearby village, from there we continued to Tawila.

(ii) Case 2:

8. My father and I were detained by RSF when trying to flee from Daraja Oula in El Fasher. An RSF commander removed me from the group, took me to an upstairs room and raped me. After this, the commander let me return to my father.

(iii) Case 3:

9. My three sisters and I, all under 18 years, were abducted from our home in El Fasher. During the first four days we were raped multiple times by various RSF combatants. My sisters died in clashes and I escaped.

Annex 7: Widespread conflict-related sexual violence persisted in RSF controlled areas[194]

Sexual violence against women and girls continued to be widespread in RSF controlled areas. RSF territory remained highly insecure, where women and girls continued to face sexual violence as a risk in their everyday life within a context devoid of the rule of law, with pervasive impunity, and limited access to emergency medical care. In RSF controlled towns and cities, RSF fighters integrated into the local population and did not always wear uniforms, making it difficult to distinguish perpetrators between RSF combatants and Arab-community allied militia.

Patterns established by the Panel last year continued.[195] Internally displaced women and girls, many who were displaced multiple times due to the war, had limited access to work, food and healthcare, were particularly vulnerable. When moving from IDP camps to the city, women and girls faced significant risks of sexual violence and rape. For example, in Nyala, South Darfur, there was an increased number of women and girls subjected to sexual violence when leaving the camp to go to work in the city, to work in the farms, or when returning to the camps. They were subjected to beatings, rape and gang rape. Similarly, in East Darfur, IDP women and girls faced sexual violence inside the camps and when leaving for work.

The lack of access to food, livelihoods, and daily labour opportunities contributed to conditions in which sexual exploitation, including survival sex, remained prevalent and reported in East, Central, West, North and South Darfur. Women and girls were coerced into transactional sex to meet basic needs, while others were pressured into providing sexual favours in exchange for access to employment and to maintain their jobs and, for example, market tea stalls.

As an indication of the widespread nature of sexual violence women and girls faced in their everyday life after the RSF takeover of the area, in South Darfur, between January 2024 and November 2025, MSF recorded 2,334 survivors of sexual violence.[196] Due to limited access to medical care and the stigma in reporting sexual violence, such numbers are merely an indication of the widespread nature of sexual violence taking place.

In addition to this, the Panel received multiple allegations that the SAF-aligned Joint Force committed rape during the urban warfare in El Fasher, including incidents in which women were coerced into sexual acts in exchange for food.[197] Similarly, the Panel received various reports alleging that in Tawila, local aid workers and community representatives exploited

[194] This section is based on multiple interviews with 17 interlocutors, including IDPs, reliable sexual and gender-based violence local monitors, local monitors, humanitarians, as well as refugees and women rights activists. The Panel uses the term "conflict-related sexual violence" as sexual violence that forms part of a wider pattern of violence and is occurring within a context impunity in Darfur, directly linked to parties the conflict.

[195] See Panel's final report S/2025/239 para. 46-50.

[196] MSF Surviving the Sexual Violence Crisis in Darfur 2026 see: https://www.msf.org/report-surviving-sexual-violence-crisis-darfur.

[197] Interviews with 10 local human rights monitors, reliable sexual and gender-based violence local monitors and civilians having fled the violence.

the precarious conditions of IDP women, coercing them into sexual acts in exchange for food.[198]

Customary international humanitarian law prohibits rape and other forms of sexual violence, which may constitute war crimes and, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians, crimes against humanity.[199]

[198] Interviews with 10 local human rights monitors, reliable sexual and gender-based violence local monitors and humanitarian workers. The coercion of sexual acts in exchange for food generally constitutes sexual violence and violations of the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law.

[199] Customary International Humanitarian Law prohibits the use of rape and other forms of sexual violence in armed conflict. CIHL Rule 93. Under international criminal law rape and other forms of sexual violence constitute war crimes. Where committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians, such acts may also amount to crimes against humanity. ICC Rome Statute Articles 7,8.

Annex 8: Arbitrary detentions of civilians continued across Darfur

RSF arbitrary arrests and detentions were ongoing, widespread and included detention in overcrowded severely inadequate facilities with limited access to food, water, sanitation, and medical care. Detainees were subjected to ill-treatment, torture, sexual violence and died in custody. Women and children were among those detained. (See annex for investigation).

Case study: Thousands remained detained after the fall of El Fasher[200]

Shala prison: In January 2026, over 2,000 people were estimated to be detained in the prison.[201] The Panel confirmed that at the time of writing hundreds of civilians, including women, Joint Force members and *hors de combat* remained detained in the prison. According to the Sudan Doctor's Network, children were detained in Shala prison.[202] RSF extorted fees for the release of detainees. In some cases, RSF collected fees without releasing detainees.

Al Mena Al Bary (see map above): RSF held detainees in overcrowded shipping containers where substandard conditions caused deaths. One survivor was detained for multiple days with dead bodies inside the container. The Panel confirmed that women and children were among those who had been detained and that women and girls, including those under 18 years, were subjected to repeated rape. The Panel received information that people remained detained at Al Mena Al Bary.

The Children's Hospital: At the time of writing, the hospital was being used as an RSF logistics centre, however, the Panel obtained information that people remained detained at the Children's hospital and that women had been detained there.

Case Study: Nyala – the ongoing unlawful detention of thousands, including women[203]

Tagris (Dagrees) in Nyala, South Darfur, was the largest RSF high security prison in Darfur. Although exact figures were difficult to confirm, in October 2025 approximately 6,000 detainees were brought to the prison from El Fasher, adding to those already detained estimated at between 10,000 to 19,000 prisoners. The Panel verified that women were detained at the prison. Detention conditions were severely inadequate. The Panel received reports of overcrowding, ill-treatment, torture, and limited access to food, water and medical care leading to the deaths of many detainees.

[200] Interviews with 15 firsthand testimonies, survivors, local human rights monitors, IDPs, refugees, civil society interlocutors May-June 2026

[201] OHCHR Sudan, Report on the RSF final offensive and capture of besieged El Fasher 14-30 October 2025, 13 February 2026, see https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ohchr-report-rsf-final-offensive-and-capture-besieged-el-fasher-24-30

[202] Sudan Doctors Network April 2026 https://x.com/sdn154/status/2048707694010208573?s=46&t=h1euRHL4MyH4aJcB2RbgAA

[203] Interviews with 15 firsthand testimonies, local sources, human rights monitors, IDPs, refugees, civil society interlocutors May-June 2026.

Detainees included, but were not limited to, political prisoners, soldiers, fighters and *hors de combat* from the El Fasher takeover, civilians accused of supporting SAF, former civil servants refusing to work for the RSF, journalists and human rights defenders. For example, the journalist Muammar Ibrahim, who was arbitrarily arrested in El Fasher in October 2025, was detained in critical health condition without access to medical care.

128. The lack of governance, security and rule of law resulted in an unstable security situation. At the time of writing, RSF arbitrary arrests in Nyala continued. In addition to Tagris prison, and similar to those patterns observed in El Fasher, in Nyala detainees were held in smaller, lesser-known detention sites, including private homes, whose locations were unknown. The Panel received first-hand information confirming ill-treatment, crowded conditions, insufficient water and food. Extortion sums were paid to RSF prison guards for release.

Annex 9: Sudan Founding Alliance (TASIS)

1. The Panel identified the following trends characterizing developments related to TASIS:

   (a) The so-called "parallel government" still lacked functioning institutions despite the appointment decrees for ministerial positions issued by the head of TASIS, Mohamed Hassan Al-Ta'aishi, on 4 May 2026.[204] In practice, administrative governance continued to be exercised by the RSF military administration. The absence of TASIS governance on the ground appeared to reflect an immediate conflict of interests between RSF field commanders, who benefited financially from administering certain territories, and the establishment of a civilian administration under TASIS.

   (b) TASIS continued to face significant financial constraints. As a result, its plans to open the offices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Justice in Nyala in May 2026 did not materialize. Interlocutors interviewed by the Panel indicated that financial instability in Gulf countries resulting from the war with Iran had become the principal obstacle.

   (c) The establishment of the Council of Regions in Nyala on 14 April was consistent with TASIS's previously stated support for a decentralized system of governance favouring Sudan's regions and communities. However, the mechanism for constituting the Council, which included representatives only from areas under RSF control, appeared primarily intended to accommodate community leaders by granting them a degree of decision-making autonomy, rather than establishing a unified legislative and governance framework.

   (d) The creation of TASIS was intended to unify forces opposing the Government of Sudan and SAF. However, the attempted assassination of Musa Hilal, together with the subsequent defections of influential Mahamid generals to SAF, including Major General Al-Nour Ahmed Adam ("al-Qubba") and Brigadier General Ali Rizqallah ("Al-Savanah"), reinforced the perception among the Panel's interlocutors that the Mahariya clan of the Rizeigat community continued to dominate decision-making within RSF while sidelining other communities.[205]

   (e) The defections of senior RSF commanders raised questions regarding the future cohesion and prospects of both RSF and TASIS, including their relations with leaders of the Salamat, Beni Halba and Misseriya communities, as well as the Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) faction led by Abdelaziz Adam al-Hilu. The defections shook the Rizeigat as the dominant component within the alliance.[206]

[204] See: https://thesudantimes.com/sudan/sudan-peace-govt-names-ministers-amid-truce-signals/.

[205] See: https://darfur24.com/en/2026/04/20/rsf-commander-al-qubba-arrives-in-army-held-areas-after-defection/ see also https: //www.msn.com/en-xl/news/other/dissident-rsf-commander-savannah-arrives-in-khartoum/ar-AA23mKZY.

[206] Four influential generals of SPLM-N, particularly Musa Kowa Maki, Kamelkowa Maki, Ramadan Hassan Nimir, Ahmed Belga, representing Nuba community formed an opposition to Abdelaziz Adam al-Hilu regarding military alliance with RSF.

(f) The so-called "parallel government" did not receive international recognition.

2. Overall, developments during the reporting period indicated that TASIS continued to face significant institutional, financial and political constraints, limiting its ability to evolve into an effective governing authority independent of RSF.

Annex 10: Uncrewed Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs)[207]

A. Strategic UCAVs

1. Strategic UCAVs are drones with long endurance that can travel long distances and are reusable. They are used either as launch platforms for various types of munitions, such as bombs, rockets, and one-way attack drones (OWAs), or as platforms for reconnaissance. These UCAVs operate at higher altitudes than other types of drones. There are two categories of strategic UCAVs: medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) and high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE). MALE drones typically operate at altitudes of approximately 7,000–15,000 m, while HALE drones operate above 15,000 m, up to approximately 18,000 m.

2. Strategic UCAVs are characterized by long, straight wings, with a wingspan typically measuring two to three times the length of the fuselage. Beneath these wings are hardpoints, which are attachment points for carrying weapons, reconnaissance pods, or other mission equipment. Strategic UCAVs are equipped with either fixed or retractable landing gear, typically consisting of a single nose landing gear strut and a pair of main landing gear struts, which in some models are semi-circular in shape. In Sudan, all known strategic UCAVs are propeller-driven, using either tractor or pusher propeller configurations. This gives them a significantly lower speed than jet-powered fighter aircraft; however, they offer much greater endurance, lower noise levels, and a significantly smaller radar signature.

3. These drones are remotely operated via a first-person view (FPV) system, in which a live video feed from the drone's onboard camera is transmitted directly to the ground control station, allowing the pilot to see what the drone "sees" in real time.

B. One-Way Attack (OWA) drones

4. One-way attack (OWA) drones carry an explosive payload intended to detonate upon impact. Unlike bombs, rockets, or missiles, OWA drones are capable of loitering over a target area until the operator—or an onboard automated guidance system—determines the optimal moment to strike. Consequently, these drones are also referred to as loitering munitions (LMs) or kamikaze drones. They are expendable by design, and little of the drone typically remains intact after impact.

5. OWA drones come in a wide variety of sizes and configurations. In Sudan, however, they are generally smaller than strategic UCAVs and have a shorter operational range. They lack a conventional undercarriage, such as wheels or landing skids, and are typically launched from a rail or catapult, while the lightest models are hand-launched. Some OWA drones can be carried by a strategic UCAV and are released at a relatively short distance from the target area.

[207] For technical information, classification and terminology the Panel made use of the book Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (Strategic Handbook Series | Volume 1), published in 2021 by Harpia Publishing VerlagsGmbH, Austria (ISBN 978-1-950394-05-0).

6. The explosive payload carried by OWA drones varies but typically ranges between 20 kg and 40 kg. Their operational range generally lies between 50 and 100 km. In most designs, there is a trade-off between payload and range: a heavier explosive payload requires either a reduction in fuel capacity or a larger airframe. Consequently, for drones of a given size, a larger payload generally results in a shorter operational range.

7. Some OWA drones are equipped with a first-person view (FPV) guidance system, allowing an operator to control the drone until impact. Others rely on autonomous or semi-autonomous guidance systems, such as satellite navigation, inertial navigation, terrain matching, or electro-optical target acquisition.

C. Multirotor Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (MUAVs)


8. Multirotor uncrewed aerial vehicles (MUAVs) are drones equipped with multiple powered rotors, typically ranging from four to eight. MUAVs employed in armed conflict are commonly fitted with a mechanism for carrying and releasing hand grenades or mortar bombs, or are equipped with one or more firearms. The release mechanism or weapon system is operated remotely by the drone pilot.

9. MUAVs used as uncrewed combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) share many characteristics with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) drones originating from the high-end consumer and professional drone markets. They are reusable but have a relatively short operational range and are typically operated close to the area of combat.

10. In some instances, MUAVs are modified to carry an explosive payload and are subsequently employed as one-way attack (OWA) systems.

11. These drones are typically equipped with a pair of landing skids, and many feature foldable arms to facilitate transport. MUAVs are generally operated using a first-person view (FPV) system, which transmits a live video feed from the onboard camera to the pilot, allowing the drone to be controlled from the drone's perspective in real time.

Annex 11: Key identification characteristics of the CH-95 strategic



UCAV

Image: CH-95 UCAV (© PoE on the Sudan; image derived from photographic material available on the drone).

A. Description of the part indicated by a number:

1. Pitot tube — Forward-mounted air data probe used to measure dynamic pressure for airspeed computation;
2. Fuselage-to-canopy seam configuration — Structural and aerodynamic joint providing access to the electronics bay and the navigation antenna installation;
3. Sharp fuselage contour line — Distinct geometric break caused by a structural kink in the fuselage profile;
4. Nosewheel–strut attachment — Mechanical interface connecting the nosewheel assembly to the nose gear strut;
5. Nose gear torque link — Articulated linkage controlling alignment and preventing rotation of the nose gear during extension and retraction;
6. Non-retractable main landing gear strut — Semi-circular fuselage-mounted main gear support integrated into the lower fuselage belly;
7. Wing-to-tail-boom fairings — Rounded aerodynamic fairings smoothing the transition between the wing structure and the tail booms;
8. Twin tapered tail booms — Slightly tapered structural booms connecting the wings to the vertical stabilizers;
9. Vertical stabilizer leading-edge kink — Approximately 40-degree angular break in the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer;
10. Tapered rudder — Slightly tapered rudder surface extending nearly the full height of the vertical stabilizer;
11. Inclined vertical tailplanes — Vertical stabilizers canted inward at roughly 15 degrees toward the aircraft’s neutral axis;

12. Semi-circular lateral air intakes — Curved air intake openings located on the port and starboard sides of the rear fuselage;
13. Rectangular dorsal and ventral air intakes — Rectangular intake apertures positioned on the top and bottom surfaces of the rear fuselage;
14. Three-blade pusher propeller — Rear-mounted propeller in a pusher configuration providing thrust from behind the airframe;
15. Wing–fuselage alignment — Wings positioned flush with the upper contour line of the fuselage;
16. Angled winglets — Winglets canted approximately 45 degrees relative to the horizontal wing plane.

Annex 12: Video stills taken on 31 May 2025 at Nyala Airport showing a CH-95 UCAV[208]













[208] Six stills were extracted from a video uploaded by user 050751oo Viernes under the title "Video de dron de las FAR en la pista del aeropuerto de Nyala". The video was posted on 3 August 2025; however, the Panel verified that the footage was recorded on 31 May 2025, corroborated by a confidential source, and geolocated to Nyala. The 1-minute, 2-second video depicts damage to a CH-95 UAV, the runway surface, and a Toyota Land Cruiser pick-up. The video can be viewed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BH-HrXxnThI&t=4s.

Annex 13: Additional strategic drones most likely CH-95 at Nyala Airport May 2026



Annex 14: Key identification characteristics of the Akıncı strategic UCAV




Image: Akıncı UCAV (© PoE on the Sudan; image derived from photographic material available on the drone).


1. The Baykar Bayraktar Akıncı is a twin-engine HALE unmanned combat aerial vehicle notable for its gull-wing configuration and tractor-propeller layout, in contrast to the pusher-prop designs common among MALE/HALE UAVs. Its two turboprop engines provide pull thrust, mounted forward on the wings rather than aft on the fuselage.

2. The aircraft features a single-boom tail, exhibiting a rounded triangular cross-section, supporting a single vertical stabilizer and two low-mounted horizontal tailplanes. The Akıncı is equipped with a fully retractable tricycle landing gear, improving aerodynamic efficiency during cruise.


3. For operations in adverse weather, the wings, horizontal stabilizers, and vertical tailplane are fitted with inflatable de-icing boots, enabling continued flight in icing conditions. This anti-icing configuration is uncommon among UCAVs of its class and reflects its intended high-altitude, long-endurance mission profile.

4. The Baykar Bayraktar Akıncı has a length of 12.2 m, a wingspan of 20 m, and a height of 4.1 m.

Annex 15: Nyala One-Way Attack (OWA) drones



Annex 16: SAF denial of airstrike on El Daein hospital



الصفحة الرسمية للقوات المسلحة
SUDANESE ARMED FORCES PAGE

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MOST GRACIOUS, THE MOST MERCIFUL

GENERAL COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES

SATURDAY, MARCH 21, 2026

STATEMENT

THE SUDANESE ARMED FORCES GENERAL COMMAND HAS FOLLOWED WITH ASTONISHMENT THE ACCUSATIONS CIRCULATED BY THE TERRORIST RAPID SUPPORT MILITIA (JANJAWEED) AND ITS SUPPORTERS, ALLEGING THAT THE SUDANESE ARMED FORCES ATTACKED AL-DAEIN HOSPITAL.

THE SUDANESE ARMED FORCES (SAF) AFFIRMS THAT IT IS A REGULAR FORCE COMMITTED TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NORMS. THIS PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR, HOWEVER, IS CHARACTERISTIC OF THE RAPID SUPPORT MILITIA, WHICH HAS REPEATEDLY CARRIED OUT SUCH ATTACKS, STRIKING HOSPITALS IN EL-OBEID, DILLING, KADUGLI, UM RAWABA, RAHAD, AND AL-DABBA, KILLING HUNDREDS OF PATIENTS AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL. THE MILITIA HAS ALSO TARGETED WATER AND ELECTRICITY FACILITIES IN EL-OBEID, KOSTI, KHARTOUM, AND MEROWE.

ATTACKING SERVICE AND HEALTHCARE FACILITIES IS A CONSISTENT APPROACH AND A DAILY PRACTICE CARRIED OUT BY THIS TERRORIST MILITIA, WHICH HAS COMMITTED MASSACRES IN EL FASHER, AS WELL AS CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, WAR CRIMES, AND ETHNIC CLEANSING.

WE CALL ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS, AS WELL AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, TO FULFILL THEIR MORAL AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES BY CONDEMNING THE CONDUCT OF THIS CRIMINAL MILITIA, HOLDING IT ACCOUNTABLE FOR VIOLATING UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, PARTICULARLY IN EL FASHER AND DARFUR, AND HALTING THE SOURCES THAT PROVIDE IT WITH THE WEAPONS USED TO COMMIT THESE ATROCITIES.

OFFICIAL SPOKESPERSON OF THE ARMED FORCES

SAF

Annex 17: Peace initiatives

A. QUAD and Quintet

1. By June 2026, the QUAD and Quintet initiatives represented the most promising diplomatic frameworks for resolving the conflict in Sudan.[209] The QUAD provided a framework for mediators with differing interests on Sudan and proposed humanitarian truce and nationwide cease fire, building on the 2023 Jeddah Agreement. The Quintet focused on creating a platform for dialogue among Sudanese civil society groups and political actors.

2. The inclusion of Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the QUAD was meant to influence the belligerent parties towards a negotiated solution. However, countries continued to support SAF and RSF interests. The deteriorating relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE further impaired the QUAD.

3. RSF and SAF, for different reasons, did not support the QUAD initiatives. SAF insisted on the withdrawal, dismantling and disarmament of RSF forces from controlled territory. SAF was particularly concerned that the QUAD could confer legitimacy on RSF by recognising it as an equal negotiating party. RSF was wary that any retreat from the frontlines and the concentration of its forces in confined areas could provoke internal conflicts within RSF and among communities under its control. Those community leaders who supported RSF throughout the conflict would risk to lose territorial, administrative and economic gains. Consequently, any success of the QUAD would depend on the armed actors' buy-in.[210]

4. The Quintet was supported by Sudanese political parties and movements[211] advocating a secular state and civilian-led institutions. The platform was of particular value to Sumoud[212] and TASIS as offered an opportunity to enhance their international standing. However, the Quintet-organised Berlin conferences in Berlin (April 2026) and Addis Ababa (June 2026) highlighted persistent discord among Sudanese actors, including the Government of Sudan and local communities, regarding participation and representation. Neither conference produced concrete outcomes.[213]

[209] QUAD – United States, Saudi Arabia, United Arabic Emirates, Egypt; Quintet - African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, League of Arab States, European Union, United Nations.

[210] Interviews with diplomats, SLA-MM leadership, SLA-AW former members, RSF active members, Democratic block members, Sumoud and Umma Party representatives, AU officials, former officials of the Government of Sudan with the detailed knowledge of the negotiation position of the main actors of the conflict, Sudanese tribal community leaders, Sudanese diaspora in Kampala, Nairobi, Juba, Cairo, Port Sudan, February –June 2026.

[211] Sumoud, Democratic block, Umma Party, National Forces Coordination Committee, Communist Party, Ba'ath Party

[212] Sudan's Civil Democratic Alliance of Revolutionary Forces headed by the former Sudanese Prime-Minister Abdallah Hamdok.

[213] Interviews with; see also https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/quintet-statement-on-the-ongoing-consultations-with-sudanese-political-stakeholders-in-addis-ababa-ethiopia-3-5-june-2026; Interviews with diplomats, SLA-MM, SLA-AW, Democratic block, Sumoud, Umma party, AU officials, former officials of the Government of Sudan, Sudanese tribal community leaders, Sudanese diaspora in Kampala, Nairobi, Juba, Cairo, Port Sudan, June 2026.

B. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and African Union (AU)

5. The Government of Sudan considered the reopening of IGAD's office in Khartoum in May 2026, headed by the former Sudanese diplomat, Rania Mustafa, to signal practical re-engagement and expression of support. While Sudan regained its IGAD membership, its suspension from the AU prevented further engagement with AU on resolving the conflict. On 12 February 2026, AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) reconfirmed the Sudan's suspension pending the restoration of civilian rule.[214]

6. Nonetheless, the AU pursued diplomatic engagements. On 21 June 2024, the AU PSC established an ad hoc Presidential Committee, led by Uganda President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni.[215] President Museveni met with Malik Agar, the Deputy Chair of the Transitional Sovereignty Council of Sudan (13 February 2026), and with Hemedti, RSF leader (20 February 2026). The Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly criticised Uganda's engagement with RSF, arguing that it strengthened the group's regional standing. The Ugandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the meetings were intended to assess the possibility of a bilateral meeting between Al-Burhan and Hemedti.[216] Civil society representatives in Kampala informed the Panel of RSF's plans to open a TASIS office there.[217] At the time of writing, this had not occurred.

[214] Interviews with diplomats, SAF high-ranking officers, Sudanese diaspora leaders, members of Sudanese political parties and movements, AU officials in Kampala, Nairobi, Addis-Ababa, Cairo, March-June 2026; "Sudan urges African Union to end suspension of its membership", 12 February 2026, see https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/sudan-urges-african-union-to-end-suspension-of-its-membership/3827921; "IGAD appoints Sudanese diplomat as chargé d'affaires in Khartoum", 22 May 2026, see https://sudantribune.com/article/314264.

[215] Communique of the 1218th meeting of the PSC, held at the level of Heads of State and Government, on 21 June 2024, on Consideration of the Situation in Sudan, 24 June 2024, see: https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-1218-hosg-communique-sudan-en.pdf.

[216] Panel's meeting with the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, Kampala, Uganda, 7 April 2026;
"Museveni Meets Sudan Deputy Leader Malik Agar, Calls for Urgent Peace and Stability", February 13 2026, see https://ugdiplomat.com/museveni-meets-sudan-deputy-leader-malik-agar-calls-for-urgent-peace-and-stability; "Sudan condemns RSF chief's visit to Uganda as minimising 'human values'", 22 February 2026, see https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/22/sudan-condemns-rsf-chiefs-visit-to-uganda-as-minimising-human-values.

[217] Interviews in person with civil society members, Sudanese diaspora, RSF members, former SLA-AW members in Kampala, April 2026.

Annex 18: Defence Industries System Sudan – Masad 100 Kg Air Demolition Bomb

مجمع الشجرة الصناعي-الزخيرة
AL-SHAGARA INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
Excellence Award Winners

منظومة الصناعات الدفاعية
DEFENCE INDUSTRIES SYSTEM
SUDAN – MASAD – السودان

ADB 100
100Kg Air Demolition Bomb

Aviation Demolition Bomb (ADB) mainly used for strikes against Soft-Skin vehicles, Light-armored vehicles, and ground targets. And can be dropped from various types of fixed-wing aircrafts.


Technical Specifications:	
Designation	SH100
Caliber	100
Bomb length (not including fuse)	1000 ± 10mm
Diameter	245mm
Fin span	285 ± 3mm
Bomb weight (including fuse)	84 ± 2kg
Weight of filling (TNT)	27kg
Weight of empty body	57kg
Weight of booster	0.2kg
Explosive type	TNT
Dropping way	Gravity dropping
Temperature	± 55°C
Life span	20 years
Packing	
4 unit/steel cage	



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Annex 19: Defence Industries System Sudan – Masad 250 Kg Air Demolition Bomb



Annex 20: New Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) in use with RSF in Darfur

1. The APCs have four doors and a long, sloping rear section. A heavy machine gun is mounted on the roof behind a steel protection plate, with an armoured gun shield or turret for the gunner. The APCs are originally finished in a uniform matte sand colour, over which a custom stencilled camouflage pattern has been applied. Some vehicles also bear a spray-painted identification number on the rear section.

2. APCs with a matte green finish have also been observed. However, the green paint appears to have been applied hastily, with the turret vision blocks having been painted over. These vehicles likewise feature a stencilled camouflage pattern applied across the body. The last colours applied to APC appeared in social media in early July 2026, featuring a black-green finishing with white stencilled motives spread over the body.[218]

3. Despite the veil of secrecy surrounding the APC, the Panel has identified a number of indicators that point in a particular direction:

   (a) APCs supplied to the Libyan LAAF closely resemble those currently in service with the RSF. It is highly likely that the RSF APCs were manufactured by the same company as those supplied to the LAAF. Furthermore, both fleets appear to have followed the same supply route, with the vehicles sourced from outside Libya;[219]

   (b) The RSF APCs are fitted with lifting lugs welded to the roof[220] (two lifting eyes on each side), facilitating loading onto and offloading from ships by crane. This constitutes a further indication that the vehicles were transported by sea and originated overseas;

   (c) Several sources[221] have informed the Panel that the armoured body of the RSF APCs is mounted on a commercially available chassis manufactured by an international truck manufacturer;

   (d) The APCs in service with the RSF exhibit several design features that are consistent with armoured vehicles designed and manufactured in the United Arab Emirates;[222]

   (e) Over the past two decades, the United Arab Emirates has developed a substantial armoured vehicle industry. At least nine companies manufacture armoured

[218] See next page for a sideview rendering of the sand and the middle-green and black-green versions of the APC.
[219] See https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2061571422913167765 (posted 1 June 2026, visited 1 July 2026).
[220] See https://x.com/AfriMEOSINT/status/2066438754768712106 for a view of the lug mounted on the roof beside the driver's head, as seen in the video clip at 0:02 (posted 15 June 2026, accessed 1 July 2026).
[221] Confidential sources; an open-source post provides a suggestion consistent with this assessment, see: https://x.com/AfriMEOSINT/status/2066438754768712106 (posted 15 June 2026, visited 1 July 2026)
[222] Confidential sources; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1994736641148084312 (posted 29 November 2025, visited 1 July 2026).

vehicles, several of which actively promote their ability to customise vehicle designs to meet specific customer requirements.[223]




Image ZX: Unidentified armoured personnel carrier (APC) finished in matte sand colour, with stencilled black motif markings and hand-applied numerals, documented in Darfur in service with RSF during the period October 2025 to June 2026 (© PoE on the Sudan; image derived from photographic material available on the APC).




Image ZY: Unidentified APC finished in matte middle green with stencilled black motif markings, observed in Darfur operating with RSF in May and June 2026 (© PoE on the Sudan; image derived from photographic material available on the APC).

[223] The nine companies are in alphabetical order: AL JASOOR (https://aljasoor.ae/ part of Edge Group); Artan Armored Vehicles (https://www.artanarmored.com/); Calidus (https://www.calidus.ae/); Emirates Defense Technology (http://www.emiratesdefense.com/); International Armored Group (https://www.interarmored.com/locations/); NIMR Automotive (https://nimr.ae/ part of Edge Group); STREIT Group (https://www.armored-cars.com/); TAG Dynamics (https://www.tagdyn.com/uae); Ultimate Armour Works (https://ultimate-armour.com/) (all sites visited on 1 July 2026).



Image ZZ: Unidentified APC finished in matte black-green with stencilled white motif markings, recorded in Darfur in operational use with RSF during June and July 2026 (© PoE on the Sudan; image derived from photographic material available on the APC).

Annex 21: Delivery of Boeing 727-200Fs to N'Djamena, Chad




Image: Boeing 727-225(F) (W), manufacturer serial number (MSN) 22438 (ex-PR-TTW), depicted in the livery applied for its delivery flight to N'Djamena commencing 30 October 2024 (© PoE on the Sudan; image derived from photographic material available on the aircraft).




Image: Boeing 727-2M7(F), MSN 21951 (ex-N726CK), depicted in the livery applied for its delivery flight to N'Djamena commencing 25 May 2025 (© PoE on the Sudan; image derived from photographic material available on the aircraft).




Image: Boeing 727-2M7(F), MSN 21951 (ex-N726CK), depicted in the livery applied during its landing at Nyala Airport between 30 May 2025 and 3 August 2025 (© PoE on the Sudan; image derived from videographic material available on the aircraft).




Image: Boeing 727-224(F) (W), MSN 22252 (ex-N725CK), depicted in the livery applied for its delivery flight to N'Djamena commencing 28 April 2026 (© PoE on the Sudan; image derived from photographic material available on the aircraft).

Annex 22: Boeing 727-200 aircraft on the military apron at N'Djamena International Airport, Chad

